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The growing use of project bonds in funding infrastructure globally deserves attention. 
Although primarily dominated by the developed markets, emerging markets such as 
Latin America and Asia have also been successful in using project bonds to finance 
their infrastructure projects. The project bond market in South Africa remains 
insignificant, with only a few episodic issuances in the last decade. Given the size of 
the country’s capital markets, institutional investor base and experience with project 
finance transactions; one would expect the country to have a sizeable project bond 
market. This paper aims to investigate whether or not South Africa has the capacity to 
use project bonds to fund its infrastructure development. As government finances take 
strain, and as bank funding becomes unavailable due to Basel III, South Africa will 
need to look to the capital markets for the funding of its ambitious infrastructure plan. 
This paper finds that South Africa should begin to use project bonds and capital markets 
to fund its infrastructure development. However, more needs to be done on the 
regulatory and legal side to ensure that the country continues to attract foreign 
investment for infrastructure development. 
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Infrastructure plays an important role in facilitating economic development and it is a 
critical catalyst for attaining high levels of economic growth. There are two types 
infrastructure and, although structurally different, both are equally important drivers of 
sustainable economic growth. Economic infrastructure includes power, water, transport 
systems (railways, airports, ports, and roads), telecommunications systems and 
pipelines. Economic infrastructure promotes investment and allows countries to 
produce at their natural level, thereby satisfying the needs of both the domestic market 
and the foreign market through international trade.  
 
Social infrastructure includes schools, hospitals, prisons, housing, leisure and sports 
facilities. Social infrastructure, on the other hand, provides benefits to individuals, 
reduces the burden and dependency on government, promotes political stability and 
increases social cohesion. 
 
The structural difference between the two is in the measurement and quantification of 
returns from investment. Economic infrastructure provides direct returns to investment, 
which are easily measured and quantified (e.g. revenues, cash flows, return on equity, 
return on assets). Returns from social infrastructure are difficult to measure because not 
only do they accrue to the government (investor) but they also accrue to the private 
individual(s) and yield low monetary benefits unlike economic infrastructure. These 
include increased human capital, a more productive labour force, increased innovation 





and an entrepreneurial society. Unlike economic infrastructure, these are difficult to 
quantify. However, they are undoubtedly as equally important as economic 
infrastructure in any economy. 
 
The role of project bonds in financing infrastructure and private-sector activities has 
evolved since the birth of the project finance market in the 1980s. Private-sector entities 
have historically used project finance and project bonds for large-scale projects such as 
mining, pipelines, and oil fields. However, from the early 1990s, private firms began to 
finance infrastructure projects such as toll roads, power plants and telecommunication 
systems using the project finance structure. Recently, we have seen project finance and 
project bonds also being used to finance social infrastructure projects such as schools, 
hospitals, university residences and prisons. 
 
Given South Africa’s infrastructure needs and limited funding, it is important to 
investigate project bonds as an alternative source of funding for infrastructure 
development. While the banking sector has historically provided most of the funding, 
Basel III will reduce commercial banks’ ability to provide long-term financing and, 
given South Africa’s constrained fiscus and balance sheet, the government will need to 
look at the capital markets for future funding. 
 
1.2 Background of the study 
The African Development Bank Group (2012) estimates that Africa’s infrastructure 
upgrading and modernization needs will reach $360billion up to the year 2040 for 
projects identified under the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA). In their study, Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate Africa’s current 





infrastructure financing needs to be $93billion per annum. The current investment falls 
significantly short, with the funding gap estimated at $38billion per annum. In their 
study of global infrastructure trends, the McKinsey Global Institute (2013) estimates 
that $57trillion in global infrastructure investment will be needed between 2013 – 2030 
to keep up with GDP growth, and infrastructure financing as a share of GDP will need 
to increase from around 3.8% to 5.6% in 2020 worldwide 
 
South Africa has a large infrastructure deficit and domestic finances are insufficient to 
fund this gap. In the World Bank (2015) Logistics and Performance Index report, South 
Africa was ranked 38th out of 160 countries globally in terms of infrastructure 
development. While impressive for a developing country, access to sustainable power 
and clean water remains limited and many citizens are without housing and education 
facilities. Transport infrastructure (road, rail, ports) remains underdeveloped, 
hampering local productivity and international trade.  
 
Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) estimate that around 70% of South Africa’s rural 
population live at least two kilometers away from an all-season road. Kumo, Omilola, 
and Minsat (2015) found that in 2013, only 2% of South Africa’s rural households had 
access to fixed-line internet infrastructure, compared with 9.2% in urban and 16.2% in 
metropolitan areas. Although government continues to use its own balance sheet to 
bridge the infrastructure gap, the financing is still not enough. 
 
Given South Africa’s infrastructure financing challenge, this study looks at debt capital 
markets, specifically project bonds, as an alternative source of infrastructure financing 
in South Africa. While the South African government and state-owned enterprises have 





issued several international bonds in the capital markets for the financing of 
infrastructure projects, they have not explored project bonds as a financing alternative. 
Long-term institutional investors have the capacity to invest in this asset class and 
increase investment in infrastructure assets. Croce and Yermo (2013) estimate their 
assets to be $80 trillion, with only 1% invested in infrastructure. 
 
Although investment in infrastructure by institutional investors remains low, they have 
the capacity and appetite to invest in this asset. We have seen many institutional 
investors locally and abroad set up infrastructure teams for direct investing in 
infrastructure assets and infrastructure funds for indirect investing. According to 
Ehlers, Packer, and Remolona (2014), the lack of well-structured projects is one the 
major reasons for the low investment in infrastructure by institutional investors. 
 
Infrastructure is a major driver of economic growth and it is important that we 
continuously look for innovative funding methods, thereby unlocking South Africa’s 
growth potential. Many business leaders; corporates; and policy makers argue that 
South Africa’s under-developed infrastructure is one of the reasons for its stagnant 
economic growth.  
 
Therefore, it is worth investigating if South Africa is ready to tap into the capital 
markets using project bonds for its infrastructure development. As government’s 
balance sheet gets strained and banking sector funds dry up, they will need to find 
diverse sources of funding for future projects. If structured correctly, project bonds can 
be used to attract investment for the country’s ambitious infrastructure plan. 





1.3 Problem Definition 
South Africa is facing an infrastructure deficit and insufficient funding to finance its 
infrastructure plans. Most of the country’s infrastructure projects have been financed 
using bank loans in conjunction with Export Credit Agency support. However, since 
the global financial crisis and increased capital requirements for banks, bank financing 
for infrastructure projects has shrunk. Banks no longer have appetite for long-term 
financing. Ehlers (2014) found that infrastructure related syndicated project finance 
loans in emerging markets shrunk from a peak of $300bn in 2008-2010 to $230bn in 
2011-2013. 
 
This paper will look at project bonds as an alternative to commercial bank loans. Project 
bonds have been successful in developed countries such as the United States, Australia 
and Canada where a significant number of infrastructure projects are financed through 
this instrument. Developing regions such as Latin America have also been successful 
in raising funding through project bonds and now we are seeing issuances from other 
developing regions such as Asia.  
 
To test for the viability of project bonds, we will analyse the size and depth of the global 
debt capital markets to determine whether there is sufficient capital to drive growth in 
project bonds. We will then analyse investor and issuer objectives and determine 
whether project bonds are able to satisfy those objectives, which will be important for 
the establishment of an efficient project bond market that meets the needs of both 
issuers and investors. 
 





A country’s regulatory environment, legal institutions and the protection of property 
rights are very critical in attracting investment, especially for infrastructure which is 
physical, immobile, and costs up to several billion dollars. Institutional voids are a 
major challenge in emerging markets and the protection of property rights can be very 
weak, resulting in low levels of investment, even from domestic investors. Therefore it 
is important to analyse the legal and regulatory environment in South Africa to establish 
whether it is conducive to issuing project bonds and attracting foreign investment. 
 
Lastly, we will look at the determinants of at-issue credit spreads for project bonds. 
This will provide insight into which factors are important to investors when they price 
this instrument. While some general factors, such as tenor, size of the bond, and credit 
rating play a role in the pricing, there are other factors such as host country economic 
and regulatory variables that are equally important to investors, which we will be 
paying close attention to. 
 
1.4 Specific objectives 
The objective of the study is to investigate whether South Africa is ready to use project 
bonds to finance its infrastructure development. The aim is to determine whether 
project bonds are a suitable alternative to commercial bank financing and whether 
project sponsors should look at accessing the capital markets using project bonds to 
finance their infrastructure projects. This paper will address the following research 
objectives: 
1. Review the global project bond market. 
2. Ascertain whether the South African legal and regulatory environment is 
conducive to issuing project bonds. 





3. Examine the factors that determine the at-issue spreads for project bonds. 
 
1.5 Justification for the study 
There are two main reasons why this study is being undertaken. Firstly, infrastructure 
development continues to be a challenge in South Africa. While there are many on-
going initiatives aimed at expediting infrastructure development, funding continues to 
be scarce. Given South Africa’s economic challenges and the regulatory changes in the 
banking sector, funding will be even more constrained in the medium-to-long-term. 
Although there is much academic literature on how South Africa and the rest of the 
world can attract funding, the research is primarily focused on reshaping the 
macroeconomic environment (monetary and fiscal policy); domestic and foreign policy 
coordination; and foreign direct investment. There is not enough research that looks at 
using alternative funding sources, specifically project bonds and capital markets to 
finance the country’s infrastructure deficit.  
 
Secondly, there has not been any research on the use of project bonds in South Africa, 
which have been successful in many emerging markets. The growth of the global 
project bond market and their success in other developing countries warrants a study 
on how they can be used in South Africa, given its ambitious infrastructure plan. At 
present, there is one study that was conducted by the African Development Bank in 
2012 that looks at the use of this instrument in Africa and concludes that South Africa 
is one of the few countries on the continent that is ready to use this instrument, given 
the capacity of its institutions and the depth of its capital markets. 





Research shows that infrastructure leads to economic growth. In their study, Estache, 
Speciale and Veredas (2005) found that economic infrastructure (roads, power and 
telecommunications) contributes significantly to long-run growth in Africa.  
 
Calderón (2009) finds that the growth pay-off of reaching Mauritius’s infrastructure 
development is a 1.1% increase in per annum GDP in North Africa and 2.3% in Sub-
Saharan Africa, with most of the contribution coming from more, rather than better, 
infrastructure. Across Africa, infrastructure contributed 99 basis points to per capita 
economic growth, versus 68 points for other structural policies. Most of the contribution 
came from increases in stock (89 basis points), versus quality improvements (10 basis 
points). 
 
Our study becomes useful because it addresses the question of how South Africa can 
fund its infrastructure deficit and once we begin to effectively answer that question, we 
begin to find solutions for economic growth and development. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
Firstly, academic literature on project bonds is very limited. While various studies on 
infrastructure mention project bonds, there are no academic studies that focus on project 
bonds. We therefore had to rely on industry reports and data for much of the information 
contained in this paper. 
 
Secondly, data on the performance of project bonds is unavailable. We therefore used 
the Dow Jones Brookfield Global Infrastructure Broad Market Corporate Bond Index 
(DCR) as a proxy for the performance of project bonds which we test for in section four 





of this paper. However, it is important to note that, this index was launched on the 16th 
July 2015. All information presented prior to the index launch date is back-tested. The 
back-test calculations are based on the same methodology that was in effect when the 
index was officially launched.  
 
Lastly, when collecting data for project bonds issued between 2009 and September 
2015 in order to evaluate the determinants of at-issue spreads, we started off with 424 
project bonds. However, many project bonds are issued through private placements, 
therefore much of the information is not disclosed. We therefore removed those bonds 
from our sample. Secondly, majority of project bonds issued in Latin America (Brazil, 
Mexico, and Peru) and Malaysia are local currency bonds and are not rated by the any 
of the ratings agencies. Those were also removed from our sample. Lastly, we only 
selected bonds denominated in United States dollars from our sample. 
 
1.7 Outline of the paper 
This paper is divided into seven sections. In section two we review the relevant 
literature; section three looks at the research methodology; section four will be an 
analysis of the global project bond market and issuer and investor objectives; section 
five looks at the legal and regulatory environment; section six tests for the determinants 
of at-issue spreads; and section seven concludes and makes recommendations for future 
studies. 
 









In this chapter we will define project finance and project bonds; we will review 
literature on how project finance has been used to finance infrastructure projects; we 
will look at literature on why project bonds are now a relevant and preferred debt 
instrument in project finance; we will assess issuer and investor objectives; we will 
review existing legal and institutional framework and whether it supports project bond 
financing in South Africa. The chapter concludes by looking at the determinants of 
project bond credit spreads.  
 
2.2 Definitions 
In this section we will look various definitions of project finance and project bonds. It 
is important to understand what project finance is in order to obtain a better 
understanding of project bonds and how they fit into the project finance structure. A 
project bond is a debt instrument that can only be issued via a project finance structure. 
You cannot issue a project bond without having a project finance structure in place. 
 
Most infrastructure projects are funded using the project finance structure. The off-
balance sheet nature of this structure makes it an attractive financing mechanism for 
governments and state-owned enterprises. These organisations have a large pipeline of 
infrastructure projects, which they fund mostly with debt; therefore the project finance 
structure allows them to take on large amounts of debt, which is not included in their 
balance sheets.  





2.2.1 Project finance 
Finnerty (1996) defines project financing as the raising of funds on a limited-recourse 
or non-recourse basis to finance an economically separable capital investment project 
in which the funders look primarily to the cash flows from the project as the source of 
funds to service their loans and provide a return on their equity invested in the project.  
Project financing is used mainly to finance infrastructure such as pipelines, refineries, 
power generation facilities and toll roads. 
 
Comer (1996) describes project finance as financing that is repaid solely by the cash 
flows from a specific asset and secured solely by that asset and its contracts. Lenders 
do not have recourse to the owners of the project for repayment of the debt. It entails 
allocation of risks to entities best equipped to handle that specific risk. 
 
Esty and Christov (2002) describe project finance as a structure whereby a corporate 
sponsor invests in and owns a single purpose, industrial asset (usually with a limited 
life) through a legally-independent entity financed with non-recourse debt. 
 
Esty (2004) states that the project finance structure involves the creation of a legally 
independent project company financed with equity from one or sponsoring firms and 
non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing in a capital asset. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) defines project finance as a 
funding method in which the lenders look primarily to the revenues/cash flows 
generated by a single project, both as the source of repayment and as security for the 
exposure. Project Finance transactions play an important role in financing development 





throughout the world. This type of financing is usually for large, complex and 
expensive installations that might include, for example, power plants, chemical 
processing plants, mines, transportation infrastructure, environment, and 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
 
According to Switala (2009), project financing can be described as a specialized 
funding structure that relies on the future cash flows of a project as the primary source 
of repayment. The project’s assets, rights and interests are held as collateral or security. 
It is often referred to as non-recourse or limited recourse finance whereby the lenders 
have no or limited recourse to the sponsors or shareholders of the project company for 
the repayment of the loan. Because it is an off-balance financing structure, the project 
finance structure allows the public sector to tackle its infrastructure backlog in 
partnership with the private sector with limited requirements from its own resources. 
 
Sawant (2010) describes project finance as the financing of a single-purpose 
infrastructure asset with a limited life through the creation of an independent legal 
vehicle, (usually a special purpose vehicle), characterized by non-recourse debt or 
limited recourse debt, high debt levels, and detailed long-term contracts; where the 
composition of such assets is not altered during the course of the SPVs life. 
 
Gardner and Wright (2012) state that, as a financing technique, project finance is 
described as the raising of finance on a limited recourse basis, for the purposes of 
developing a large capital-intensive infrastructure project. The borrower is a single 
special purpose vehicle (SPV) and repayment of the financing by the borrower (SPV) 





will be dependent on the internally generated cash flows of the project. Project 
financing allows the shareholders to book the debt off-balance sheet. 
 
Yescombe (2014) defines project finance as a method of raising long-term debt 
financing for major projects through ‘financial engineering,’ based on lending against 
the cash flow generated by the project alone. It depends on a detailed evaluation of a 
project’s construction, operating and revenue risks, and their allocation between 
investors, lenders, and other parties through contractual and other arrangements. 
 
2.2.2 Project Bonds 
The European PPP Expertise Centre (2012) define project bonds as debt instruments 
issued by PPP project companies and typically bought by institutional investors (e.g. 
insurance companies, pension funds). In some instances they are tradable on secondary 
markets. 
 
Boudrias and Kotkin (2012) state that project bond markets include non-recourse 
project-based bond issuances, generally with longer tenors and investment grade ratings 
(however not a requirement) where a typical issuance would be from a project operating 
company with a long term off-take contract with the debt amortizing fully by the term 
of the contract. 
 
Conduit and Lee (2013) define project bonds as bonds issued to capital market 
investors, which finances (the whole or part of) a project financing. The bond can be 
used for initial project financing, either co-financing with commercial bank debt or to 
refinance existing bank debt, often post construction. 





Mezui and Hundal (2013) define project bonds as debt instruments with the following 
characteristics: they are issued to raise capital for specific standalone projects; coupons 
and principal repayments are serviced from the cash flows generated by the specific 
project; and they assume, and their performance is subject to certain project specific 
risk. 
 
In their definition of project bonds, Croce and Gatti (2014) state that project bonds can 
be referred to as bonds that are issued by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) and sold 
either to banks or, more frequently, to other bond investors. The project bond can be a 
straight bond, whose creditworthiness depends on the cash flow performance of the 
SPV, or a secured bond assisted by credit enhancement mechanisms. 
 
Mclean (2015) states that a project bond is a bond used to finance (or re-finance) one 
or a portfolio of infrastructure assets. The project bond may be listed on a stock 
exchange or may be issued through a private placement. Project bonds offer tenors of 
up to 40 years where the maturity can match the life of the concession or off-take 
contract. 
 
Oji (2015) states that infrastructure project bonds serve as an additional source for 
raising funds from local and international capital markets. Interest payments and 
repayment of the principal are secured by the cash flows from specific projects. 
Infrastructure bonds can also be issued by private sector firms without any government 
intervention. 
 





The OECD (2015) defines project bonds as standardized securities that are issued solely 
to finance individual stand-alone infrastructure projects. They can be issued in public 
markets, or placed privately and provide a potential solution to finance brownfield 
projects with long-term debt. Project bonds are more risky because the risk of loss to 
credit holders is higher for any one specific project versus a diversified portfolio of 
projects. 
 
2.3 Project finance and infrastructure projects 
Esty and Christov (2002) argue that project finance is not a new phenomenon. One of 
the oldest recorded applications of project financing dates as far back as 1299, when 
the English Crown enlisted a Florentine merchant bank to aid in the development of the 
Devon silver mines. Early trading expeditions in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries were also financed on a project basis. Investors provided financing to the 
Dutch East India Company and British East India Company for voyages to Asia after 
which they were repaid according to their share of the cargo once sold. 
 
In the 1970s project finance began to evolve into its modern form, partly in response to 
several large natural discoveries and partly in response to soaring energy prices and the 
resulting demand for alternative energy sources. In the early 1970s British Petroleum 
raised $945million on a project basis to develop the “Forties Field” in the North Sea. 
Esty et al. (2014) found that in the early 1990s municipalities began to marry project 
finance with public-sector activities, which gave rise to public-private partnerships 
(PPPs or P3) that were used to expand the pool of funds in the face of limited 
government budgets. Through PPPs, governments were able to shift construction and 





operating risk to the private sector in attempt to improve efficiency, while governments 
typically assumed market risk  
 
In the year 2000, the project finance market peaked, reaching $378.7bn in deals closed. 
Chan-fishel (2003) shows that between 1998 and 2003 infrastructure projects attracted 
the most funding from global project financing, with telecoms representing anywhere 
between a quarter and half of infrastructure financing between 1998 – 2001. 
 
We see from Esty et al. (2014) that over the last few years, total project-financed 
investment recovered to $415.0 billion in 2013 from a depressed level of $249.3 billion 
in 2009. The four-year project finance CAGR from 2009 to 2013 for all regions was 
10%. 
 
2.4 Global project bond market 
According the Boudrias & Kotkin (2012), the project bond market was born in the early 
1990s when project sponsors began accessing the bond market to finance projects. 
Since then, capital markets have been used to access finance for various projects on a 
non-recourse basis. These include oil and gas projects; power generation assets and 
infrastructure projects, both in developed and emerging markets. 
  
While project bonds have in the past been used to finance infrastructure projects in 
developed countries, Dailami and Hauswald (2003) find that access to the international 
bond markets by infrastructure projects in emerging economies is relatively new, borne 
of the economic reforms, market liberalization and financial innovations. Although 
many developing countries around the world use project bonds for infrastructure 





financing, the South African project bond market is characterized by episodic issuances 
than a normal flow of transactions. 
 
Esty et al. (2014) found that project bond issuance has largely been concentrated in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, which together accounted for half the 
total market in the last five years, as at July 2014. Nonetheless, between 2009 and 2013 
project bonds have been used to finance projects in an increasing number of developing 
countries. One noticeable change over the last ten years is that project bonds have 
become more common in developing countries such as Brazil, Malaysia, and Peru. 
 
Although they still represent a small fraction of debt financing for infrastructure 
projects, projects bonds continue to increase their market share in the financing of 
infrastructure projects. Between 2007 and 2012, projects bonds issued by SPVs ranged 
between USD 8.5bn and USD 27bn. In 2013 we saw a record amount of USD 49.3bn 
in project bond financing, representing 19% of total debt provided to project finance. 
 
Research by Esty et al. (2014) shows that from a sector perspective, 85% of all project 
bond issuances between 2009 and 2013 went to finance infrastructure, oil and gas, and 
power. Infrastructure attracted 35% of all bond financing, followed by oil and gas, with 
28%, and power, with 23%. The four-year CAGR for total project bond financing 
between 2009 and 2013 was 56%. All sectors had massive four-year CAGR; the sector 
with the highest growth was social infrastructure, where bond issues tripled. 
 





2.5 Project bond investor objectives 
Institutional investors are usually considered long-tern investors due to the long-term 
nature of their liabilities. They hold more illiquid and long-term assets that include 
infrastructure projects or long-term bonds and other forms of alternative investments 
than other investors. Although institutional investors have several objectives, which 
determine which asset classes to invest in, there are three important objectives that drive 
the investment allocation decision which we will discuss in this section. 
 
2.5.1 Asset and Liability match 
In their study, Oliver Wyman (2012) state that infrastructure assets are attractive to 
institutional investors (pension funds) as they can assist with liability driven 
investments and provide duration hedging. Because infrastructure projects are long-
term investments they could match the long duration of pension liabilities. 
 
Standard & Poor’s (2014) find that institutional investors are becoming increasingly 
attracted to infrastructure as a result of their need to match long-term assets and 
liabilities. However, many non-traditional investors remain wary of such assets. 
  
Infrastructure investment offers an attractive asset-liability match because it allows for 
substantial investments with steady returns over decades according to Schoenberg 
(2015). Infrastructure provides “annuity-type” returns over decades that are in general 
reasonably predictable. 
 





2.5.2 Superior Risk-Adjusted Returns 
OECD and Oliver Wyman (2011) found that pension funds are increasingly looking at 
infrastructure to diversify their portfolios, due to the low correlation of infrastructure 
with traditional asset classes. 
  
Research by Helmsley (2014) found that infrastructure promises long-term stable cash 
flows, delivering reliable returns from 8% up to as high as 15%, including an attractive 
yield component.  
 
In their study, CBRE Clarion (2015) found that between 2010 and 2014 global listed 
infrastructure outperformed global equities and global bonds whilst maintaining lower 
levels of volatility than other equity sub-sectors. Global infrastructure five-year 
annualized total returns were +13.1% versus global equities, which had a +12.7% total 
return, and global bonds, which returned +2.1%. 
 
Van Nieuwerburgh, Stanton and de Bever (2015) found that between December 2003 
and June 2015, the MSCI World Core Infrastructure Index Sharpe Ratio was 0.80, the 
MSCI World Infrastructure Index 0.61, and the MSCI Emerging Markets Infrastructure 
Index 0.62. During the same period the NCREIF Property Index Sharpe Ratio was 0.47, 
equities 0.50, bonds 0.47 and U.S. REITs 0.45. We see that infrastructure as measured 
by the three indices outperformed all the other asset classes. 
2.5.3 Low default rates 
Infrastructure debt as an asset class has lower default probabilities and higher recovery 
rates than equivalently rated corporate bonds. 





Standard & Poor’s (2013) found that between 1992 and 2012, the annual default rate 
for all rated project finance debt averaged 1.5% which was slightly lower than the 
average corporate issuer default rate over the same period 
 
In his study of project finance default rates, Davison (2015) found that the marginal 
annual default rates for project finance bank loans averaged 1.4% per annum during an 
initial three year period following financial close, but fall significantly thereafter 
trending towards marginal default rates consistent with single-A category ratings by 
year 10 from financial close. 
 
2.6 Project bond issuer objectives 
2.6.1 Access to a greater pool of funds 
Sheppard (2003) argues that the international capital markets represent the largest and 
deepest source of financing globally, and in conjunction with local capital markets, 
which represent an essentially untapped source of funds for infrastructure projects, they 
can make a meaningful contribution to economic development, if effective transaction 
structures are developed. 
 
The global capital markets are significantly larger than the banking market. It is through 
this market that governments and private corporations are able to frequently borrow 
hundreds of billions of dollars from investors. Capital market investors, the majority of 
whom are institutional investors, have the capacity and the liquidity to provide a large 
quantum of long-term funding that the banking sector is no longer able to do. 
 





According to Valahu (2006), government and their private partners are increasingly 
turning to capital market issues as a way to bring in a vast new array of investors, while 
reducing the cost of project-related debt. As capital markets in emerging countries 
develop, sovereign and sub-sovereign public entities will make increased use of these 
markets to fund major public-private works projects. 
 
Erol & Ozuturk (2014) suggest that capital markets can be used as an effective 
environment in mobilizing long- term investment funds into infrastructure. Capital 
market investment motivates the participation of the private sector in infrastructure 
projects, easing the constraints imposed by the public sector budget on infrastructure 
development and the burden on taxpayers. 
 
2.6.2 Cheaper source of funding 
In his study, Hale (2001) finds that in countries where the liquidity of the country is 
questionable, banks cannot do much to reduce their risk, even by monitoring individual 
loans. The additional costs associated with banking then makes it cheaper for the 
borrowers to borrow on the bond market, resulting in a larger share of bonds. 
 
Russ and Velderrama (2012) argue that given the choice between bank and bond 
funding, certain firms lean toward bond financing because it is typically cheaper than 
bank loans, where the bond yield is lower than the bank interest rate for the lowest-risk 
borrowers. 
 
Croce and Gatti (2014) find that project bonds have some contractual features that make 
them more attractive to institutional investors rather than banks. Firstly, bonds are more 





standardised capital market instruments and show better liquidity if the issue size is 
sufficiently large to generate enough floating securities. A higher degree of liquidity 
can trigger a lower cost of funding vis-à-vis syndicated loans. 
 
2.6.3 Flexible covenant package 
According to Verde (1999), covenants help align the actions of borrowers with the 
interests of its lenders throughout the life the debt. Loan covenants provide both explicit 
and implicit protections. High yield bond investors generally do not have the benefit of 
financial covenants and the explicit protections afforded to high-yield bondholders are 
weak in comparison to those provided to leveraged loan lenders. 
 
Although high-yield bonds are well-known for their complex covenant packages, Vita 
(2011) argues that financiers often find the “incurrence” based nature of high-yield 
covenants an attractive alternative to the financial maintenance covenants they are 
accustomed to in the senior bank finance environment. 
 
Looking at the covenant packages of syndicated loans and bonds, Payden and Rygel 
Reaearch (2013) found that syndicated loans offer stronger credit quality relative to 
high-yield bonds, given their senior status in the capital structure and more exacting 
financial covenants. Syndicated loan covenants offer superior credit quality because 
they must be maintained unlike bond covenants, which are incurrence covenants that 
are only tested when the issuer wants incur more debt. 
 





2.7 Regulatory and institutional environment 
In a country-level study done by Knack & Keefer (1995) they find that institutions that 
protect property rights are crucial to investment. In fact their study shows the security 
of property rights not only affects the magnitude of investment but also the efficiency 
with which inputs are allocated. 
 
According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the legal 
environment and the quality of law enforcement are determinants of what rights 
security holders have and how well these rights are protected. Given that the protection 
investors receive determines their readiness to finance firms, corporate finance may 
critically turn on these legal rules and their enforcement. 
 
Cross-country data and firm level regression by Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 
(2002) shows that a firm’s investment is affected by the perceived security of property 
rights. Reinvestment rates were found to be the lowest in Russia and Ukraine, where 
property rights are least effective, and highest in Poland and Romania, where property 
rights are most secure. 
 
According to Esty (2002), New York and UK law are most preferred for lenders 
contracts and agreements. However, the operating contracts and the enforcement of 
security provisions (e.g. seizure of collateral upon default) depend on the legal system 
in the country where the project is located. Therefore lenders must understand their 
rights as creditors and the efficiency of local enforcement before lending in a given 
country. 
 





Foreign and local investors in South Africa are subject to the same laws and regulations 
according to Tralac (2004). Foreign investors have equal rights and obligations within 
South Africa’s judicial system. However, foreign investors have the option of settling 
a dispute through international arbitration, provided there is a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) in existence between the parties and that it makes provision for such 
arbitration. 
 
In the latest Doing Business report by the World Bank, South Africa is ranked 46th out 
of 162 countries on the Enforcing Contracts index, with its distance to frontier being 
66. The enforcing contract index measures the efficiency of the judicial system in 
resolving a commercial dispute. Although the country fares better than all African 
countries and most developing countries, more needs to be done to improve the 
regulatory and legal framework in order to attract more investment. Policy coordination 
remains critical in achieving the required improvements. 
 
2.8 Determinants of project bond credit spreads 
Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) found that spreads can almost entirely be 
explained by three influences, namely: the expected loss from defaults, state and local 
taxes and the premium required for bearing systematic risk. 
 
In their study of the determinants of at-issue spreads for project bonds, Dailami and 
Hauswald (2003) found that market risk perception in terms of at-issue spreads over 
US Treasury Bonds are a function of a project’s contractual structure and its ambient 
institutions. They also find that on average, project bonds are issued at approximately 
300 basis points above US Treasury Securities. 





In their study of the determinants of emerging market spreads, Rowland and Torres 
(2004) found that the economic growth rate, debt-to-GDP ratio, reserves-to-GDP ratio, 
and the debt-to-exports ratio are found to be significant determinants of the spread for 
emerging market sovereign issues. Additionally, the spread is also determined by the 
exports-to-GDP ratio, and the debt service to GDP. 
 
Examining the determinants of credit spreads for South African corporate bonds, 
Grandes and Peter (2007) found that sovereign risk is the single most important 
determinant of corporate credit spreads. Firm leverage, firm-value volatility, time to 
maturity and risk-free interest rate volatility are also statistically significant 
determinants of corporate spreads. 
 
Using information from listed Korean corporate bonds, Shin and Kim (2013) foundd 
that credit risk is a more influential determinant of yield spreads than liquidity 
especially after the recent global financial crisis. Average trading volume and equity 
volatility of the bond issuers were found to be significantly correlated to yield spreads. 
 
 









This chapter describes the research methodology used in this study. Both qualitative 
and quantitative methods will be applied in answering the research objectives provided 
earlier. This paper will rely on secondary research and data to answer the research 
hypothesis of whether the South African market should begin to use project bonds to 
fund its infrastructure development. We will also discuss limitations and potential 
problems of this research, including any validity and reliability issues faced. 
 
3.2 Research Approach 
Thomas (2003) differentiates between two types of research approaches: deductive 
research and inductive research. The primary purpose of the inductive approach is to 
allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant or significant themes 
inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by structured methodologies. The 
purposes underlying the development of the general inductive approach include: to 
summarise extensive and varied raw data; to establish a relationship between the 
research objectives and the summary of findings derived from the raw data and to 
ensure these links are both transparent and defensible; and to create a model or theory 
about the underlying structure of experiences or processes which are evident in the text 
(raw data). 
 
According to Standers et.al (2003) the deductive approach is where a researcher makes 
an observation and collects data in an attempt to build a theory. Neuman (1997) states 





that in deductive research, the researcher starts with an abstract, logical relationship 
among concepts then moves towards concrete empirical evidence. Gill and Johnson 
(2002) argue that the deductive research method involves the development of a 
conceptual and theoretical structure prior to its testing through empirical observation. 
They further argue that logical ordering of induction is the reverse of deduction as it 
involves moving from the empirical world to the construction of explanations and 
theories about what has been observed. 
 
In this paper we use the deductive approach by analysing existing literature and data to 
respond to the research questions. Through the findings of existing literature, the paper 
will determine whether to reject or fail to reject to the research hypothesis, the use of 
project bonds to fund South Africa’s infrastructure development. Deductive research 
also allows us to explore broader issues that we would have otherwise not been able to 
do with inductive research given the insignificant size of the project bond market in 
South Africa, limited local experience with project bonds and lack of information 
relating to project bonds that have been issued in South African. 
 
Data on project bonds and their performance is limited and in some cases confidential 
making it difficult to conduct an inductive study. Banks and institutional investors are 
often restricted in the information they can share as a significant number of project 
bonds are issued via private placements. Therefore, deductive research allows us to 
analyse information that has been published by project finance and project bond experts 
and participants and form a hypothesis. 





3.3 Research Strategy 
According to Creswell (2009), the research strategy involves making a decision 
regarding the data collection method and analysis, which must be suitable to the 
research study. 
 
Newman and Benz (1998) identify two main types of research methods: qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, with some studies being a mix of both research methods. 
Quantitative research takes a deductive approach, where research is used to test the 
theory and qualitative research takes an inductive approach, where the theory is created 
from the research. 
 
“Quantitative research can be constructed a research strategy that emphasizes 
quantification in the collection and analysis of data” and “by contrast, qualitative 
research can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather 
than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
 
Bryman and Bell (2007) state that the quantitative approach collects knowledge from 
positivist assumptions, where the inquiry has experimental and quasi-experimental 
design. Quantitative research methods are predetermined and use close-ended 
questions, performance, attitude, observations and census data. On the other hand, 
Quantitative approaches are used to test or verify theories, identifying variables to 
study, using standards of validity and reliability and using unbiased approaches and 
employing statistical approaches. 
 





In my study I employ both quantitative and qualitative research methods as this 
provides a better opportunity to answer the research questions. The major advantage 
with quantitative research is that it enables the researcher to collect and analyse large 
quantities of data and be able to draw reliable generalisations from the data. The major 
disadvantage is the inability to find granularity in the information. Qualitative data, on 
the other hand, allows researchers to dig deeper into issues and to test for certain 
hypotheses. Using (credible) data and appropriate statistical methods, researchers are 
able to test and prove their hypothesis. 
 
3.4 Data Collection 
There are two data collection methods. Primary data collection is where the researcher 
gathers new data primarily through questionnaires and surveys. Secondary data is 
collected and studied from existing literature. It involves using work done by other 
researchers to address one’s research objectives.  
 
This study uses secondary data, which is more appropriate for addressing the research 
objectives. In order to obtain the data I used different scholar databases such as EBSCO 
Host, Emerald, Harvard Business Review, IMF eLibrary, Jstor, Science Direct, Wile 
Online Library, Social Science Research Network, World Bank Group, South African 
National Treasury, South African Reserve Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
I also used financial services industry databases such as J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, 
Duetsche Bank, Brookfield Asset Management, Prudential Investment Managers, 
Standard and Poor’s, Project Finance International, Bloomberg LLP, Moody’s Investor 





Services, Fitch, Thompson Reuters, Dealogic, European PPP Expertise Centre, Deloitte 
and Ernest & Young. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
The data has been presented in the form of an extensive literature review, where I have 
presented the findings of different studies and researchers. I have also presented the 
data in the form of excel tables, graphs and charts in order to allow for easier 
comparison and interpretation. 
 
Furthermore, this study employs statistical analysis using regression tools. The 
regression analysis is used to study the relationship between two variables, an 
independent and a dependent variable. We use the results to conclude whether one 
variable has an effect on another variable and whether the effect is statistically 
significant. 
 
3.6 Limitations and potential problems 
The major limitation faced when conducting this study is the availability of project 
finance and project bond data. Project bonds and project finance have not received 
much attention in the academic fraternity resulting in limited academic studies. It is 
also difficult to obtain quantitative information on project bonds, as many academics 
and investors have not paid a lot of attention to this asset class. The information 
available was supplemented with industry information and analysis. 
 





3.6.1 Data reliability and validity 
In order to achieve reliability and validity of the data I only used data from recognised 
and reliable sources as described earlier. Where possible, this data was verified using 
other sources including databases such as Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters. The 
chosen methods of analysis, which include descriptive statistics and regression analysis 
helped ensure increased transparency and non-biasness in the data and results. 
 
 





CHAPTER 4:  
ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL PROJECT BOND MARKET 
 
4.1 What are project bonds? 
According to Hauswald and Dailami (2003), the difference between project and 
corporate bonds stems from the underlying economics of the borrower. In the case of 
the project, the issuer (borrower) raises funds to finance a single indivisible large-scale 
capital investment project whose cash flows are the sole source to meet financial 
obligations and to provide returns to investors. In the case of a corporate borrower, the 
security is typically issued against the firm’s general credit and the underlying assets 
consist of multiple sources of cash flow. 
 
Leng, Fong and Sulaiman (2003) argue that project bonds differ from conventional 
corporate bonds in certain legal and financial characteristics. Project bonds are used to 
finance a specific capital investment project, which utilises potential cash flows as the 
source of debt servicing. A typical corporate bond is issued to raise funds for the general 
business activity and is secured against the firm’s general status of credit and 
underlying assets (which act as an implicit mechanism for diversification of risks for 
the investor). Risk is mitigated in a project bond issuance through effective allocation 
of repayment obligation to parties who are best suited to managing this risk. 
 
Research by the World Bank (2015) finds that project bonds were designed to create an 
asset class for infrastructure investments targeting long-term institutional investors 
such as pension funds and insurance companies. It aims at encouraging greater risk 
sharing among domestic and international investors and to increase the role of capital 
markets in infrastructure financing. 





Project bonds are different to corporate bonds. Whereas corporate bonds are issued by 
companies to fund their business activities, project bonds are issued by a standalone 
company or project company, usually a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which owns 
the project’s assets, where the proceeds from the operations of the project are used to 
service the interest and principal obligations and make dividend payments to equity 
investors. 
 
These bonds are used to finance infrastructure projects through a project finance 
structure where the lenders (bond investors) have limited recourse or no recourse to the 
project sponsors. Project finance has become the most common financing structure for 
infrastructure projects because of two main benefits. Firstly, because of off-balance 
treatment, it allows governments and state owned enterprises to undertake multiple 
infrastructure projects simultaneously. Therefore government is able to source large 
amounts of (debt) funding whilst preserving its balance sheet. 
 
Secondly, project finance debt is structured as limited recourse or no-recourse debt. 
Therefore, in the event that a project fails, the lenders’ recourse would be minimal and 
limited to the project and its assets and not the project sponsors (government and state 
owned enterprises). 
 
4.2 Who uses project bonds? 
Project bonds were first issued in the early 1990s, and were an important source of 
capital for infrastructure improvement in North America and Western Europe. 
However, Voge et.al (2009) finds that when commercial banks became more aggressive 
on pricing their loans in the late 1990s and early 2000s, project bonds fell out of favour 





because borrowers could obtain long-term project loans on terms more favourable than 
bond market terms. 
 
Project bonds in the U.S. are primarily used in the oil and gas, and renewable power 
industries, and do not include tax-exempt bonds issued as Private Activity Bonds 
(PABs) in the municipal market. Yescombe (2014) argues that taxable infrastructure 
bonds have been largely (but not entirely) ‘crowded out’ by the tax-exempt market. 
 
According to Freedman, Kassis and Treuhold (2013), the U.S. power sector played an 
import role in developing and growing project bonds. As the sector was moving away 
from the utility generation model to an independent power producer model and as 
bankers became accustomed to analysing, structuring and executing project finance 
transactions, the project bond market grew, resulting in the first Rule 144A offering for 
a large power project in the Northeast in the early 1990s. 
 
Traditionally in Europe, capital markets finance for greenfield infrastructure came from 
bonds guaranteed by monoline insurers. Because of the risk associated with large scale 
greenfield projects, issuing investment grade project bonds that were sufficiently 
highly-rated to be attractive to institutional investors required monoline insurers to 
provide wraps (guarantees).  
 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. LLP (2012) argue that these wraps enhanced the credit 
rating of the bonds, taking their credit rating to the highest credit rating of AAA. The 
wrap essentially guaranteed senior bondholders the full credit risk of the issuer 
(borrower), thus providing a safe and liquid instrument. Monoline insurers made bonds 





competitive with bank pricing by charging roughly half of what the banks charged for 
taking the credit risk. 
 
The monoline insurers were born in the United States and arrived in Europe in the late 
1980s and became significant players in the PPP financing markets from the late 1990s 
according to the EPEC (2010).  Although they played a major role in Europe, their 
greatest impact was in the United Kingdom because of the combination of 
government’s extensive Private Finance Initiative scheme and the presence of a deep 
and liquid bond market, which provided a competitive alternative to bank financing for 
infrastructure projects. The dominance of the wrapped bond market is proven by the 
fact that, when the first United Kingdom PPP project financed through capital markets 
was executed in the 1990s, and through to 2009, only two earlier projects were funded 
with bonds that did not have a monoline wrap. 
 
Today, project bonds are used both in the emerging and developed world by borrowers 
in both the public and private sector. Latin America is one notable example that has 
seen a significant growth in the use of project bonds. In her paper, Arca (2013) argues 
that the increase in project bonds issuances in this region has been driven by three 
factors: a large unmet infrastructure and energy need; significant capital available 
among fixed income investors; and constrained bank capital. 
 
In the late 1990s, Latin America also benefited from monoline guarantees that 
supported its project bond market during its infancy stage. Just like in the rest of the 
world, the Latin America monoline industry disappeared after the global financial 
crisis. Today, Latin American project bonds are issued without any insurance and have 





proven to be very attractive to global investors. Brazil has a strong track record in 
project bond financing for oil and gas drilling (using international capital markets) and 
power and toll roads (using the domestic market). According to PwC (2013), Latin 
America has the necessary conditions for project bonds to takeoff. There should be an 
increase in public-private partnerships and the use of project bonds. 
 
The Asia-Pacific market remains small compared to other markets. However, the PFI 
(2014) finds that countries like Malaysia have been very active in using project bonds 
since its first ringgit-denominated long-term project bond issued in 1993 for YTL’s 
greenfield gas-fired Paka and Passir Gudang IPPs. Many other similar project bonds 
have been issued for various infrastructure projects across the country, ranging from 
power plants, terminals to tolls roads. The Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and other 
pension funds have been the largest subscribers to these projects bonds.  
 
An important factor that ensured the successful development of the project bond market 
in Malaysia has been the existence of one or more specialist investors who understand 
the structures, sectors and have expertise to analyse transactions. With the support of 
local rating agencies, the EPF has taken this role in Malaysia. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2008) reports that Australia has financed the majority 
of its PPPs and infrastructure projects using project bonds. It too relied heavily on the 
credit enhancement of monoline insurers before the market disappeared during the 
2008/2009 global financial crisis.  
 





According to Infrastructure Australia (2014), as of March 2008, there were $27billion 
worth of credit-wrapped bonds outstanding in Australia and between 2005 and 2007 
the bond market had provided $6.2billion of long-term monoline wrapped project 
bonds. The project bond market effectively closed due to the global financial crisis and 
PPPs had to rely on short-term bank loans.  
 
Morris and Ng (2014) found that Australia has returned to the project bond market, 
financing and refinancing brownfield infrastructure projects with project bonds. 
 
Various governments, especially the American and European governments, have 
initiatives aimed at growing their project bond markets and increasing capital market 
investment in infrastructure. In 2012, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Commission launched the Europe Project Bond Initiative (PBI) as a way of 
stimulating capital markets investment in large infrastructure projects. Under this 
initiative, the project companies (SPVs) will issue project bonds and the EIB will 
provide credit enhancement in the form of a subordinated instrument (either a loan or 
contingent facility) to support the senior debt issued by the project company. 
 
As bank lending for infrastructure projects becomes limited, largely due to Basel III, 
we should see more of these initiatives globally and an increased focus on project 
bonds. South Africa has both the experience and expertise with project finance to be 
able to structure and execute project bond transactions. The country also has a 
significant capital markets sector, large institutional investors and the institutional 
capacity, which are all important elements in creating a successful project bond market. 





4.3 How do project bonds work? 
While there are fundamental differences between project bonds and corporate bonds, 
the main difference stems from the economics of the borrower or issuer according to 
Hauswald and Dailami (2003). Corporate Bonds can be used for multiple purposes, 
including the financing of expansions, capital improvements, acquisitions, and debt 
refinancing. Bond investors rely on the balance sheet strength of the issuer (company) 
for coupon and principal payments and security can take the form of any of the 
company’s assets. 
 
Project bonds, on the other hand are issued by a standalone project company, usually 
an SPV, and the proceeds are used solely for the construction of a single asset owned 
and operated by the project company. Cash flows generated by the asset are the only 
source of interest and principal payment for bond investors. Bond investors assume all 
the risks of the underlying asset, which also serves as their collateral. In the event of 
default or failure, recourse is limited to the project’s assets. 
 
Project bonds are generally rated by the major rating agencies in order to attract capital 
market investment. They can be issued via private placements or they can be listed on 
an exchange. Investors can invest directly in the project or they can invest through listed 
and unlisted infrastructure funds. Given the inherent risks of project finance, many 
project bond issuers have had their bonds rated by one or more of the major rating 
agencies. 
  
The rating of this instrument is very important, given the reservations institutional 
investors have about investing in project bonds and infrastructure assets. The rating 





serves two purposes; firstly it sends a signal about the credit quality and riskiness of the 
project (and associated debt) and secondly it does most of the due diligence work that 
most institutional investors are not able to perform as they lack the expertise and 
institutional capacity. 
 
Project bonds can be used to finance the construction period or the operational phase 
of a project. Traditionally, project bonds have been used to refinance bank debt during 
the operational phase of a project when construction risk no longer exists. However, we 
are seeing more project bonds being issued during the construction phase of projects as 
project finance structures improve and achieve investment grade credit ratings for the 
construction phase of projects. 
 
A good example is Peru, who according to PFI (2015), recently developed a payment 
mechanism applicable to PPP infrastructure projects that has increased the bankability 
of projects by reducing their construction risk effectively down to a level equal to the 
country’s sovereign risk. In 2006 Peru introduced government backed, 
milestone-linked payment certificates that represent payment obligations of Peru. More 
importantly, these certificates/obligations are also assignable, and therefore permit 
concessionaires to tap into foreign capital markets through offerings, typically in bond 
form, that carry a risk of default closely reflecting Peru’s sovereign rating, which as of 
July 2014 had been upgraded to A3 by Moody’s. 
 
Unlike corporate bonds, project bonds have much longer tenors, ranging between 20 – 
30 years to match a project’s lifecycle. The significantly long-tenor will impact the 
pricing on these instruments given the risks associated with long-dated investments. 





However, the average life of the bond can be much shorter, depending on the structure 
of the bond. Amortising bonds, where interest and principal is paid periodically, are 
likely to have a shorter average bond life, and therefore carry a smaller premium than 
bullet bonds whose principal is only paid on maturity of the bond. 
 
Project bonds are less liquid than corporate and government bonds. The size of the 
project bond market is very small compared to other debt markets and much of the 
issuances are done via private placements. This effectively means that investors who 
invest in this asset class must be prepared to hold these bonds until maturity. Again, 
this will significantly affect the yield on this instrument, as investors will need to be 
compensated for investing in an illiquid asset. 
 
4.4 Global project bond market 
Project bonds account for a small portion of the project finance debt market. In 2013 
they accounted for 20% of total project finance debt before falling to 16.6% in 2014. 
Although project bond deals remained flat in 2014, the project loan market was buoyant 
with deals and remains the leading funding source for borrowers. Project bond deals 
closed reached $50.3billion in 2014, compared to the global project finance loan 
market, which reached new highs of $260.2billion, beyond the previous best year – 
2008, when volumes hit US$250bn. While the project finance loan market grew by 
23% from the previous year ($204 billion – 2013), the project bond market remained 
flat ($49bn in 2013). 
 









Although project bonds remain small compared to the loan market, there has been 
significant growth in the project bond market between 2009 and 2014. Project bond 
deals doubled in size in 2013 reaching $49.2billion ($24.1billion – 2012) and remained 
steady in 2015 with $50billion in deals. This indicates growing investor appetite for 
infrastructure assets. Issuances have been rising since steadily since 2009, with the six-
year period (2009 – 2014) registering a CAGR of 34%. 
 
The project bond market has done generally well, as shown in figure 1 above. In 1997 
project bond deals closed stood at only $7.5billion (10% of the project finance debt 
market, which stood at $75billion). By 2003 the project bond market had grown to 
$32.2bn in just 6 years (over 300% growth) representing 17% of project finance debt. 
In 2002 project finance deals slipped and this was felt in both the project finance loans 
and bond markets. According to PFI (2003), the boom in the US power financing came 






















Source: Author’s calculations based on PFI data 





Between 2003 and 2007 the market remained steady although there was a small decline 
in issuances due to aggressive pricing from banks. During the global financial crisis 
2008-2009, project finance bond deals decreased considerably. This is mainly due to 
the fact that monoline insurers, who had insured many of these bonds lost their 
investment credit rating and there was no longer a benefit from wrapping the bonds and 
investors no longer had access to the AAA investment grade security. Given their 
significant exposure to the sub-prime market, and inability to meet all their insurance 
claims, by 2009 most of the monoline insurers had gone out of business.  
 
Oil & gas, power, and infrastructure account for a large market share of the project 
bond market. Until 2002, telecoms also had a sizeable project bond market share; 
however, from 2002 there was a significant drop in telecom deals such that even project 
finance loans in the telecom sector fell sharply. 
 
















Source: Author’s calculations based on PFI data 
Other refers to deals episodic deals in the telecom, mining, leisure, industrial, and petrochemicals sectors 





The global project bond market plummeted during 2008 and 2009 as a result of the 
global financial crisis and the downgrading of monoline insurers. Infrastructure project 
bonds were not spared from the significant decrease in the overall issuance of project 
bonds during this period. There were very little, if any, single A rated bonds issued that 
attracted the interest and appetite of institutional investors according to PFI (2010). 
 
Project finance league tables published by PFI (2014) show that project bonds more 
than doubled in volume in 2013, driven by energy and infrastructure projects. 
Infrastructure bond issuances doubled to $18.8bn, with large PPP deals and refinancing 
taking place in Asia. We also saw the first credit-enhanced project bonds, under the 
EIBs Project Bond Initiative, the R1 refinancing in Slovakia being closed in 2013.  
 
From a country and regional perspective, the United States has been the largest driver 
of project bonds. From the inception of project finance in the US until today, they are 
the largest project finance market in the world, and rank first in both project finance 
loans and project finance bonds. Until 2002, the US power market was the primary 
driver of project finance deals, both the loan and bond side due to the liberalization in 
the power sector. There was a large sell-off of power plants to independent power 
generators by the utilities. The energy sector continues to drive project finance in the 
U.S. and more recently we have seen increased infrastructure deals. 
 
European PPP, PFI and oil and gas transactions have also been major drivers of project 
finance. Monoline insurers who effectively disappeared from the European market 
during the global financial crisis in 2008/2009 had wrapped the majority of European 





transactions. We are now seeing increased activity in Europe, partly driven by the 
recently launched Project Bond Credit Enhance initiative by the EIB. 




Mining and the privatization of the power sector led the way for project finance in Latin 
America. Since then the region has used project bonds to finance infrastructure, oil & 
gas, power and mining sector projects. Brazil and Mexico have traditionally led the 
region in project finance and project bond issuance. However, Peru has completed 
several big transactions and has contributed significantly to project finance growth in 
Latin America. Between 2011 and 2014, the region held a reasonable market share on 
the project bond side driven by issuances in the energy, power and infrastructure 
sectors. 
 
Although Asia-Pacific has seen some activity in the project finance and project bond 
deals, it has been disappointing given the size of the region and the large infrastructure 






















































































Source: Author’s calculations based on PFI data 





the largest issuers of project bonds in the region over the last 18 years (1997 – 2014). 
There have been episodic transactions from other countries such China, India and New 
Zealand in the same period but they have been minimal. India recently started using in 
local capital markets to fund its infrastructure through the issuance of local currency 
denominated project bonds. Given the size of the region and the on-going infrastructure 
development, the Asia-Pacific project bond market has the potential to grow to one of 
the largest in the world. 
 
Lack of understanding when it comes to project bonds and scarcity of bankable projects 
are some of the major obstacles in Asia. It will take some time before the market is 
comfortable of project bonds. The CEO of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
recently remarked: “For bond investors in this region to acquire expertise and set up 
internal capacity to monitor project bonds, there must be reasonable certainty or firm 
expectation that the market will be large enough to justify the cost of acquiring such 
expertise and taking up internal capacity” (Wee, 2014). 
 
Africa has also been another disappointing region. The market remains insignificant, 
with only a few episodic transactions recorded in South Africa, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Ghana and Kenya in the last 10 years. The continent needs to start looking 
into project bonds as a means of sourcing infrastructure investment from the capital 
markets. In the medium-to-long term, project bonds may prove to be in important 
catalyst in developing and growing the continent’s capital markets. 
 
Although they represent a small portion of project finance debt, project bonds are re-
emerging as a good source of financing for a variety of sectors across the regions. 





Between 2009 and 2014 we have seen their market share in project financing grow and 
we have seen an increase in the number of listed and unlisted infrastructure funds. We 
expect this trend to continue given their attractiveness to institutional investors. 
 
4.5  Project Bond Issuer Objectives 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Project bonds must offer unique benefits not offered by conventional debt instruments 
such corporate bonds and loans for project sponsors to find them attractive. In South 
Africa, project finance borrowers have financed most of their projects through the bank 
market; leaving the capital markets unutilized. While there have been episodic 
issuances, in 2013 we saw the first listing and investment-grade rated infrastructure 
project bond, held entirely by institutional investors. To date this remains the only listed 
project bond on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
 
Although borrowers have several objectives when issuing (project) bonds, we will 
assess only three objectives that are critical in growing South Africa’s project bond 
market. Firstly, we will look at whether project bonds give project sponsors access to 
the type and quantum of funding they require in order to execute infrastructure project 
finance transactions. There are various sources of funding that can be used to fund 
South Africa’s infrastructure development, however, not all of them are suitable for 
long-term financing of large-scale infrastructure projects.  
 
Secondly, we will assess whether project bonds are a cheaper source of financing when 
compared to loans. Large-scale projects on average cost hundreds of millions of dollars, 





and bank funding for 20-30 year tenors is not cheap and will soon be unavailable. 
Borrowers also run the risk of not being able to refinance bank debt or refinancing at 
higher costs. Pricing will be a key success factor in growing the project bond market. 
If project sponsors are able to secure the investment they require at the right tenor and 
price, we will should see a shift toward project bonds especially given the tight capital 
and liquidity requirements under Basel III which will drive up the cost of (long-term) 
bank loans 
 
Lastly, we look at whether (project) bonds have a more flexible covenant package as 
compared to loans. In most cases bank loans are accompanied by strict covenants with 
strict monitoring and reporting requirements. This requires additional reporting and 
disclosure from the borrower and the banks become very involved in the daily 
operations including the decision making of the borrower. A breach of these covenants 
results in an event of default. Bonds on the other hand have a more flexible covenant 
package given the nature of bond investors. This gives project sponsors more autonomy 
in the running of the project and more flexibility in times of difficulties. 
 
4.5.2 Access to a greater pool of funds 
Infrastructure projects are large-scale projects that can cost billions of dollars with long 
construction and repayment periods. The current global infrastructure expenditure in 
nowhere near the global infrastructure need. The McKinsey Global Institute (2013) 
found that between 1992 and 2011 global infrastructure investment has averaged 3.8% 
of global GDP, totaling $36 trillion. That is $2trillion over the 18-year period. They 
further estimate that between 2013 and 2030, $57 trillion in infrastructure investment 
will be needed to keep up with projected global GDP growth.   





PricerwaterhouseCoopers (2014) on other hand estimates that global infrastructure 
spending will grow from $4 trillion per year in 2012 to more than $9 trillion per year 
by 2025. Overall, almost $78 trillion will be spent globally between 2014 and 2025. 
According to Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010), Africa is currently spending 
$43billion per annum on infrastructure, far below the $93billion (15% of its GDP) it 
needs to address its infrastructure development. Oxford Economics and PWC (2014) 
estimate the continent’s infrastructure spend to reach $180billion per annum by 2025. 
If the PwC estimates are correct, the continent will have twice the amount of 
infrastructure it requires. The National Treasury (2015) reports that South Africa has a 
potential pipeline of more than R3 trillion in infrastructure projects planned over 15 
years. 
 
Historically, commercial bank lending has provided the majority of infrastructure 
investment and the current infrastructure investment is nowhere near the global need. 
Besides limited balance sheet capacity, there have been two major developments in the 
commercial bank sector that will further restrict their lending to infrastructure projects. 
Firstly, as a result of the global financial crisis, global banks that have previously 
financed mega infrastructure projects have had to reorganizing their balance sheets by 
deleveraging and reducing cross-border exposure. Secondly, there was the adoption of 
the Basel III regulatory framework, which imposes significant capital, funding and 
liquidity requirements on banks’. As a result, banks’ will no longer be able to offer the 
long-term financing required for infrastructure projects. 
 
In their study, Croce and Gatti (2015) find that debt in the form of syndicated loans has 
been the major source of financing for large-scale infrastructure projects. The project 





finance market saw a period of rapid expansion until the 2007 – 2008 global financial 
crisis. Loan funding in project finance transactions peaked to a record USD 247bn in 
2008 but declined sharply in 2009. In 2013 project finance loans recovered to an 
amount of USD 204bn, however, project finance accounted for roughly 5% of 
syndicated loans worldwide, significantly lower than the 9% peak reached in 2008. 
 
According to the PFI (2015), in 2014 project finance loans hit a new high of 
US$260.2bn (above the 2008 peak). The main driver was the US project finance market 
where volumes doubled from the previous year. Project bond financing although still 
small is gaining momentum. In 2013, project bond issuances totaled USD 49bn 
representing 20% of the total debt provided to project finance. In 2014, issuances were 
flat at USD50bn representing 16% of the total debt provided to project finance. 
 
Project bonds give borrowers access to capital markets, a market that links suppliers of 
long-term capital such as institutional investors to users of capital such as businesses, 
governments and financial institutions. Capital markets are important for the efficient 
allocation of capital and risk in the market. They ensure that capital is used productively 
and generates maximum returns for its owners. 
 
Mussa and Goldstein (1993) state that international capital markets channel resources 
from units that are savers to units that are dissavers, thereby loosening the constraints 
imposed by self-finance and enabling increases in overall productivity of investment 
and smoothing of consumption. Capital markets also provide liquidity, and allocate and 
distribute risk. 
 





Murinde (2006) describes capital markets as markets for trading long-term financial 
securities, including ordinary shares, long-term debt securities such as debentures, 
unsecured loan stocks, and convertible bonds. Capital markets allow companies and 
governments to raise long-term funds from those with funds to invest, such as financial 
institutions and private investors. 
 
Obtsfeld and Taylor (2004) argue that, at the global level, the international capital 
markets channel world savings to their most productive uses, irrespective of location. 
Emerging countries with little capital can borrow to finance investment, thereby 
promoting economic growth without sharp increases in saving rates. World capital 
markets also help countries with imperfectly correlated income risks to trade them, 
thereby reducing the global cross-sectional variability in per capita consumption levels. 
 
Capital markets are the largest and deepest source capital, with trillions of dollars raised 
every year in the debt markets according to the Thompson Reuters (2015) debt capital 
markets report. International bond proceeds for 2014 reached $4trillion, which was a 
15.4% increase from 2013 and a new market record set by the bond markets (exceeding 
the previous market peek set in 2007)  
 
Thompson Reuters (2015) shows that domicile countries driving the market included 
the United States (proceeds up 34.1%, with a 30.2 % market share of all international 
issuance), China (116.2% year-on-year increase), and Switzerland (up 158.2%). From 
an industry perspective, significant increases in issuance were seen in Healthcare 
(+117.2% over 2013), Retail (+51.1%), and Media & Entertainment (+32.4%). 
 









Bonds account for a significant market share (70%) in debt capital market issuances, 
which reached a global total of $5.7 trillion in 2014, a 2% increase from 2013. The U.S. 
accounts for the majority of issuances, with High Grade corporate debt offerings 
targeted to the US marketplace totaling US$1.1 trillion during 2014. Companies based 
in the US accounted for 61% of issuance, and issuers based in the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Japan each accounted for 4% of US marketplace issuance during 2014. 
Figure 5: Global debt capital markets by issue type 
 
 
Source: Thompson Reuters (2015) 
Source: Thompson Reuters (2015) 





Emerging markets still represent a very small portion of the global capital markets, with 
debt issuances reaching $348.6 billion in 2014, $297 billion in 2013 and $305.9billion 
in 2012. Russia, India and Brazil, Mexico and Malaysia accounted for over 50% of 
emerging market issuances in all 3 years. In his study, Masetti (2013) find that the South 
African bond exchange, the most deep and liquid debt market in Africa, had a market 
capitalization of $184bn or 47% of GDP.  
 
As evidenced by the above, the bond markets are significantly large and liquid. They 
have the capacity to fund infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars. 
 
Institutional investors such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, investment funds, 
and insurance firms are the largest investors in global capital markets. They have large 
assets under their management and they earn returns on these assets by investing in 
capital markets. Croce (2014) estimates South Africa’s pension fund sector to be equal 
to 81% of GDP, which would equal R3trillion based on 2014 GDP of R3.8trillion. 
However, only 4% of these assets are invested in infrastructure assets. Institutional 
investors belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) member countries have an estimated $100 trillion assets under management 
according to Schmukler (2015).  
 









The general average portfolio for pension funds surveyed by the OECD in 2014 shows 
that as of December 2013, 52.1% of total assets were invested in fixed income and cash, 
31.5% in equity, 1.6% in unlisted infrastructure and 14.8% in alternative/other 
investments. 
  
Although increasing, investment in infrastructure by institutional investors remains 
minuscule. Currently, average direct investment in infrastructure by pension funds 
represents around 1% of total assets across the OECD. Large pensions in Canada and 
Australia are the exception, where they have been actively raising their allocation in 
infrastructure with allocations as high as 10-15%. Croce and Yermo (2013) found that 
Sovereign Wealth Funds in countries like Singapore have allocations in excess of 10%. 
 
Preqin (2015) found that the majority of institutional investors they surveyed were 
generally satisfied with their infrastructure fund investments over the June 2014 to June 
Source: OECD (2015) 
OECD Countries Only 





2015 period. More than one-fifth felt that infrastructure had fallen short of expectations, 
and 15% of the respondents felt infrastructure had exceeded their expectations. A good 
percentage of institutional investors are still looking to increase their allocations in 
infrastructure assets as shown below. 
 




Issuing project bonds would give project sponsors access to global capital markets with 
trillions of dollars in funds. Capital market investors have more than enough capital 
available to invest in South African project bonds. From a local capital markets 
perspective, there is sufficient liquidity to invest in project bonds. The South African 
government and state owned enterprises such as Transnet and Eskom have successfully 
tapped the capital markets in the past to finance their infrastructure projects, with all of 
their issuances being over-subscribed. South Africa has the expertise and experience 
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4.5.3 Cheaper source of funding 
The cost of financing will play an important role in the decision of which debt 
instrument to use for the financing of infrastructure. For project finance, loans have 
been the major source of financing for many reasons. One of the major reasons is their 
flexibility as compared to bonds. Given the nature of bank financing, it is easier to 
restructure bank loans and avoid defaults than it is with bonds. Bank debt is also easier 
to access at a fraction of the costs incurred when accessing bond financing. Unlike the 
case with bonds, there is also no negative carry associated with bank loans. These 
factors make bank loans more attractive than project bonds. 
 
Berlin and Loeys (1988) and Diamond (1991) argue that the choice of debt instrument 
is, among others, a function of a borrower’s creditworthiness. Diamond shows that as 
the borrower’s credit worthiness improves, borrowers are likely to switch from junk 
bonds to bank loans and as creditworthiness improves even further, borrowers then 
switch back to the bond market, issuing investment grade bonds, reflecting a lower level 
of risk. 
 
Hale (2002) suggests that because banks have more monitoring power than 
bondholders, banks can refuse to rollover the loans, which represents a credible threat 
to a borrower and therefore makes monitoring efficient. In contrast, after the launch of 
an international bond, bondholders have little control over the issuer’s actions, since a 
bond issue cannot be reversed before maturity. Therefore banks can limit the risk of 
their loans and, hence, offer funds at a lower rate. However, these benefits come at a 
cost. Banks bear costs not borne by bondholders. These costs include reserve and 
capital requirements, operating and monitoring costs. Banks pass these costs through 





to their borrowers. Therefore, borrowers face a trade–off between lower risk premium 
and additional costs of bank loans as compared to bonds. 
 
Hale and Santos (2008) found that firms pay a lower spreads on their bank loans after 
they undertake their bond Initial Public Offerings. Everything else being equal, firms 
that enter the public bond market with an investment grade rated bond benefit from a 
reduction of between 35 to 50 basis points in the credit spreads they pay on their bank 
loans. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that banks do price their 
informational advantage when they extend loans to borrowers. 
 
Groobey, Pierce, Faber and Broome (2010) argue that a 144A bond offering is generally 
executed more quickly and inexpensively than a syndicated project loan and bonds can 
also pay interest at tax-exempt rates (lowering the borrower’s borrowing cost), be 
issued in fairly small amounts (making them ideal for smaller project finance 
transactions) and carry implied or explicit credit support from government 
instrumentalities (again reducing borrowing costs). 
 
Basel III is expected to pose significant challenges for banks. In particular, there will 
be a significant increase in the quantity of capital – particularly common equity capital 
– that banks will be required to hold. This is likely to lead to increased cost of project 
loans due to increased capital intensity. According to Chan and Worth (2011), high-
rated bonds will require a lower proportion of stable funding under the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio than similarly rated loans. 
 
In their model Russ and Valderrama (2012) found that although banks are able to 
monitor borrowers, this comes at a higher marginal cost of lending. While firms find it 





harder to access the bond market due to higher fixed costs, these costs are associated 
with a lower cost of funds. Therefore the marginal cost of financing capital with bond 
issues is cheaper than with bank loans – that is, the bond yield is lower than the bank 
interest rate. 
 
Contessi, Li and Russ (2013) state that bonds are commonly referred to as 
“unmonitored” lending, due to the dispersion of bond investors who choose not to 
monitor or influence the activities of bond issuers, while banks, on the other hand, 
specialize and spend resources to monitor borrowers, which typically results in higher 
cost of lending. Given a choice between the two, some firms prefer bond financing 
because it is typically cheaper than bank loans. 
 
Grant Thornton (2014) argue that bonds are cheaper to service than loans as bonds can 
be structured with bullet repayments. As a result, servicing only the interest portion of 
the loan means that debt service is considerably lower than would be the case for a 
comparable loan as banks generally require a substantial part, if not all, of the loan to 
be amortised over the loan life. 
 
Using issuances of corporate bonds by companies operating in comparable 
infrastructure sectors (water, power, transportation and oil and gas) as a proxy for 
project bonds (due to the lack of available data on project bonds in Europe), Dhondt, 
Krawchenko and Traxler (2014) found that on average, across tenors and credit quality, 
bank loan margins have been higher than bond credit spreads. As of September 2013, 
average loan credit spreads were 87 basis points higher than those for comparable 
corporate bonds. Even when corporate bond credit spreads are conservatively adjusted 





for credit quality, they have remained on average 47 basis points lower than project 
loan spreads. 
 
Furthermore, they find that the 47 bps credit spread reduction presents a cash savings 
of 9,4% (unadjusted for inflation or the time value of money) for comparable bonds 
and loan with a tenor of 20 years. This translates to billions of Euros in annual savings. 
 
In examining bond and loan spreads by tenor, Dhond et.al (2014) find that bonds still 
demonstrate a clear cost advantage across the maturity profile. For bonds issued bonds 
in 2010 to 2013 within the 10-15 year category, loan spreads are 163 bps above those 
of comparable bonds. On average, from 2010 to 2013, across all tenors (not weighted 
by issue size), loan spreads were 97 bps above those of comparable bonds. 
 
Doyle and Murphy (2012) conclude that pricing has remained a key driver in the 
popularity of project bond financing in Canada. Canadian bond yields are at historic 
lows and average credit spreads for issues continued to tighten between May 2011 and 
May 2012, reducing from 200 basis points to 187 basis points for an A rated issue. 
 
In Canada, there was competition between loans and bonds for long-term debt until end 
the 2010 (when long term bank loans were no longer available in any volume) - post 
the global financial crisis. This led to competitive pricing in the bond markets according 
to Infrastructure Australia (2014). Pricing for bonds with tenors of 30+ years started at 
385 basis points over the benchmark, decreasing to around 300 basis points in 2010 and 
decreasing further to 200 basis points in 2011. Recent transactions have priced 
marginally below 200 basis points, with the share of public private partnerships debt 





provided by bonds increased from less than 10 percent to greater than 70 percent and 
finally settling at around 50%. The use of Project Bonds before the global financial 
crisis was driven by their ability to offer the lowest cost of debt (as well as enabling 
sponsors to ‘black box’ and control all aspects of transactions). 
 
Yates (2014) argues that alternative debt solutions, such as bond financing, will play a 
significant role in reducing the margins on wind farm debt. In November 2013, Balfour 
Beatty, Equitix and AMP Capital used a project bond to acquire the offshore 
transmission link for the Greater Gabbard wind farm. This bond had a spread of 125 
basis points over the Gilt, which compares with margins for bank debt for similar, 
earlier projects of 210-220 basis points. 
Figure 8: Margins over LIBOR for long-term (7+ years) global corporate bonds 





The graph above shows the credit spreads for infrastructure project finance debt, global 
corporate bonds with A, BBB, and B credit ratings. A credit spread is measure of how 
Source: Barclays Capital; Dealogic; J.P. Morgan Asset Management 
estimate, 4Q 2012 





much more a corporation pays to borrow money than the government does. It is the 
yield between two bonds, a treasury bond and a corporate bond of similar maturity but 
different credit quality. From the above we see that infrastructure project finance 
spreads lie between BB and BBB quality corporate debt and appear less volatile. 
 
The evidence provided in this section suggests that project bonds can be a cheaper 
source of funding than loans for infrastructure projects. We have seen evidence from 
Europe where project bonds offer a clear cost advantage than loans. Project bonds are 
also cheaper to service than loans as project bonds are generally structured with 
principal bullet payments on maturity unlike loans where the principal is generally 
amortised over the life of the loan. Bondholders also have the benefit of being able 
trade project bonds in secondary market and pass on the risk to other capital market 
investors. While project loans can be syndicated to reduce a lenders exposure and risk, 
lenders will generally need the permission of the borrower should they wish to leave 
the syndicate team and pass on their exposure to other banks’. 
 
4.5.4 Flexible covenant package 
Covenants are important in the bank and bond lending markets. Firstly, they serve to 
protect the interests of the lenders by restricting the activities a borrower can undertake, 
therefore ensuring that future obligations are honoured as and when they fall due. 
 
 Secondly, they mitigate the principal-agent problem by ensuring that managers 
(agents) act in the best interests of the shareholders (principals). Lastly, covenants 
protect lenders against information asymmetry where borrowers have more information 





about the firm than lenders do. Lenders monitor adherence to covenants and any breach 
could have serious implications for the company’s ability to borrow in the future. 
 
Bond covenants are generally more flexible given the nature of bond investors. 
Borrowers prefer this as it affords them more flexibility in the running of their 
businesses. McLaughlin and Yessios (2011) state that for brownfield projects, 
covenants tend to be incurrence-based, not maintenance-based as in bank-financed 
projects. This is important because it allows borrowers to customize their bonds 
according to their needs. Where banks typically impose a set of covenants on the 
borrower, bonds are marketed with a pre-determined set of covenants by the issuer. 
 
Bonds are said to have incurrence-based covenants and loans are said to have 
maintenance-based covenants. Banks prefer maintenance-based covenants because 
these are monitored and tested frequently which allows them to take action early when 
the borrower experiences financial distress or shows strong signs of breaching the 
covenants. Borrowers, on the other hand, prefer incurrence-based covenants because 
unlike bank covenants, these are only tested in the event of a significant corporate 
action such as raising new debt, making an acquisition or paying a dividend. 
 
According to Maxwell and Shenkman (2010), with incurrence-based covenants, the 
borrower (bond issuer) need not worry about failing to comply, based on events beyond 
its control. Instead, it need only test compliance with the covenant if it proactively 
intends to take an action, such as to borrow more money, to pay a dividend, or to sell 
assets. Because there is no close monitoring by bondholders, even if there is a breach 





in the covenants, issuers have the advantage of correcting the breach should they wish 
to approach bondholders for corporate action in the future. 
 
Vita (2011) argues that bond covenants are designed to preserve the bond’s relative 
payment priority, protect against loss of equity cushion (in an insolvency scenario, 
equity ranks lower than debt) and prevent credit deterioration (through controls over 
asset and cash leakage), but without limiting a company’s ability to grow, because 
positive growth will enhance the capital value of the bonds which benefits bond trading 
prices in the secondary market. 
 
According the Payden & Rygel Research (2013), leveraged loans involve a series of 
standard covenants that dictate how borrowers can operate and finance themselves. 
These are known as maintenance covenants, which allow the lender to ensure that the 
corporate borrower “maintains” these critical measures of financial health. These 
covenants differ from those associated with high- yield bond issues as they must be met 
not only upon issuance, but typically quarterly. 
 
O’Sullivan and White (2015) argue that one of the major differences between bank 
loans and bonds was the inclusion of financial maintenance covenants in syndicated 
loan agreements. The borrower had to “maintain” a negotiated (and frequently 
declining) level of leverage, for instance, to avoid default or failure of a condition to 
further advances. The maintenance covenants included: maximum leverage ratio; 
minimum interest coverage ratio; and a minimum fixed charged ratio. 
 





In the event of default, O’Sullivan and White (2015) found that bond investors to be 
more flexible than banks. In the event of a default in interest payment, bondholders 
generally give borrowers a 30-day grace period and senior bank loans have a 3 to 5 
business day grace period. In the case of a covenant default, bondholders have a 60-day 
grace period other than mergers, asset sales and failure to repurchase upon a change of 
control. 
 
Banks’ on the other hand have no grace period for negative covenants and certain 
affirmative covenants; and 30-days for others. In the event of default in other material 
debt, bonds have a cross-acceleration clause whereby the acceleration of a loan with 
any other lender, following an event of default under another loan agreement, is also an 
event of default under their (bondholder and bond issuer) agreement. Bank loans on the 
other hand have a cross-default provision stipulating that if borrower defaults on any 
outstanding debt obligations, the borrower is considered to be in default on all 
obligations. 
4.6 Project bond investor objectives 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Institutional investors, who are the largest investors in capital markets, will be central 
in developing the project bond market in South Africa. Infrastructure continues to gain 
increased recognition as a unique asset class, and holds considerable appeal for 
institutional investors as it has the potential to deliver significant yields and match their 
long-term liabilities. Institutional investors have access to more liquid and deep funding 
unlike banks and it is their appetite for this asset that will ultimately determine its 
success.  





Preqin (2015) found that as at the end of 2014, there were 144 infrastructure funds 
globally, with a combined target size of $93 billion. The gap between current and 
targeted allocation amongst institutional investors as shown earlier indicates that there 
is room for more infrastructure investment from institutional investors.  
 
Globally, the demand for private infrastructure capital continues to grow according to 
Roberts, Patel and Minela (2015). This is driven by governmental budget constraints, 
the need for investment to facilitate continued economic growth, and a secondary 
market for existing assets, which continues to increase in importance. As regulatory 
changes affect bank term lending, investors have also begun looking increasingly at the 
provision of infrastructure debt. 
 
In this chapter we will assess three critical objectives for bond investors. Using 
qualitative and quantitative methods we will determine whether or not project bonds 
are able to satisfy those objectives. 
 
Firstly, we will look at whether project bonds provide an asset and liability match for 
institutional investors. Pension funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds are institutional 
investors that sit with long-term liabilities, which need to be matched with long-term 
assets i.e. assets that provide stable returns over the life of the liability. At present these 
investors are investing in short-to-medium-term assets and have to reconstitute their 
portfolios when these assets reach maturity. Due to its long-term nature, infrastructure 
is able to match the life of a pension plan, which can be up to 40 years. 
 





Secondly, we will assess whether as an asset, infrastructure provides superior risk-
adjusted returns as compared to other asset classes. Given its monopolistic nature, high 
entry barriers and price setting power, we expect infrastructure to deliver stable returns 
over the long-term unlike traditional asset classes that are sensitive to global 
macroeconomic conditions and move with the business cycle. We also expect to find 
infrastructure returns to be less correlated with the other asset classes, which is 
important for institutional investors and their portfolio diversification strategies. 
 
Lastly, we will assess the default rates for project and infrastructure finance debt. 
Whilst institutional investors have the liquidity and capital to invest in project bonds, 
they also have a fiduciary duty to their investors. That is, they need to act in best 
interests of their investors and not undertake activities that are risky and outside the 
scope of the investment mandate. Institutional investors must earn a return on their 
liabilities and make payouts as and when they fall due. Therefore, they will be looking 
to invest in liquid assets and assets with low probabilities of default to ensure they are 
able to meet future obligations. 
 
4.6.2 Asset-liability match 
Institutional investors are the majority investors in capital markets. They hold trillions 
of dollars in long-term savings (liabilities) and seek to earn a return on these savings by 
investing them in capital market assets and other financial instruments. Pension funds 
have long-term commitments such as pension payouts that need to be matched with 
long-term investments and infrastructure is one such asset that provides this match. 
However, average global investment in infrastructure remains low at 1%. 
 









Public “equity” and “securities other than equities”, which consists mainly of bonds, 
represents the largest share in the asset allocation decision for institutional investors. 
However, we see growth in the “other” category, which includes investments in private 
equity funds, venture capital, hedge funds, real estate, commercial loans and financial 
derivatives. Çelik and Isaksson (2014) state that the major institutional investors have 
increased asset allocation into these asset classes as they have come to understand them 
more and seek to diversify their portfolios. 
 
 Using a vector error correction model (VECM) that explicitly distinguishes between 
short-term and long-term dynamics in the joint distribution of asset returns and 
inflation, Amenc, Martellini and Zieman (2009) found that real estate and commodities 
have particularly attractive inflation hedging properties over long-horizons, which 
justifies their introduction in pension funds’ liability-matching portfolios. Their results 
Source: OECD 





suggest that alternatives are very useful ingredients for institutional investors facing 
inflation-related liability constraints. 
 
Inderset (2014) found that while institutional investors in the UK and Australia have 
been investing in infrastructure assets since the 1980s when many of the utility 
industries were being privatized, today, their investment in infrastructure is driven by 
low yields, volatile markets, portfolio diversification and enhancing long-term asset-
liability match. They are increasingly attracted to infrastructure assets with (potentially) 
favourable characteristics such as long-term, stable, and often inflation-linked cash 
flows. 
 
According to Standard & Poor’s (2014), a large number of institutional investors are 
found to be seeking greater exposure to Asian infrastructure. Investing in such projects 
seems to be a good match, particularly for insurers and pension funds, because of the 
predictable, stable cash flows and potential for asset and liability matching. However, 
the low credit quality of sovereign borrowers and issuers in the region, combined with 
currency-fluctuation risks and too-low yields, may hold many investors back. 
 
The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (2015) argues that appropriate infrastructure can 
provide pension funds with attractive risk/return profiles, liability matching cash flows 
and diversification benefits. 
 
According to Schoenberg (2015), infrastructure assets offer an attractive asset-liability 
match because they allow for substantial investments with steady annuity-type returns 
over decades that are generally predictable. However cost and ease of exit, given their 





illiquidity remains a major challenge. Liquidity would further enhance their 
attractiveness and open the projects to a wider pool of investment capital. 
 
Infrastructure bonds have the potential to solve the asset-liability mismatch that 
characterizes institutional investors. Project bonds have significantly larger tenors as 
compared to other bonds, such as corporate and sovereign bonds that have been used 
to mitigate the asset-liability mismatch. Given their monopolistic nature and ability to 
absorb macroeconomic shocks, infrastructure assets are able to able provide stable 
returns for the life of the bond. 
 
Given the global infrastructure need and the stricter regulatory environment in the 
banking sector, we will see institutional investors increase their asset allocation to 
infrastructure assets. A significant portion of the institutional investor market has 
indicated that they are willing to increase allocation to this asset; however, there is a 
lack of well-structured projects. 
 
Over time we expect to see more collaboration and less competition between 
institutional investors and banks, where institutional investors will bring their large 
quantum of capital and banks will bring their structuring, executing and monitoring 
capabilities. 
 
4.6.3 Superior risk-adjusted returns 
As an asset class infrastructure has been found to deliver superior risk-adjusted returns 
as compared to other asset classes. Given its monopolistic nature, its low correlation 





with other asset classes and its resilience to economic down turns, infrastructure assets 
are able to provide stable cash flows and superior risk-adjusted returns. 
  
To measure risk-adjusted returns we will the Sharpe Ratio, which is the most commonly 
used measure of risk-adjusted returns. Developed by William Sharpe in 1966, the 
Sharpe ratio is defined as the excess return or risk premium per unit of additional 
standard deviation. It is the excess return per additional unit of risk that is earned by an 
investor for the risk he or she takes. 
 
According to Simons (1998), the Sharpe Ratio measures a fund’s excess return per unit 
of its risk.  It is based on the trade-off between risk and return. A high Sharpe ratio 
means the fund delivers high returns for its level of volatility.  If investors are able 
borrow and lend, they can invest in the portfolio with the highest Sharpe ratio and mix 
it with the risk-free asset in different proportions. 
 
Best and Hodges (2007) define the Sharpe Ratio as the ratio of a portfolio’s expected 
return in excess of the risk-free to its expected standard deviation. Higher ratios indicate 
portfolios that are expected to yield higher risk-adjusted returns. 
 
Engels (2004) states that the Sharpe ratio plays an important role in the asset allocation 
decision and modern portfolio theory. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) theory 
tells us that the portfolio with the highest Sharpe Ratio on the efficient frontier is the 
market portfolio. This is the point the where capital market line is tangent to the 
efficient frontier, and represents the highest expected return per unit of risk. 
 





In their study that assesses the significance of the infrastructure sectors in investment 
portfolios in Australia, as well as the added value of the infrastructure sectors using 
risk-adjusted performance analysis, Peng and Newell (2007) found that infrastructure 
sectors contributed the highest returns to investment portfolio between 1995 (2nd 
quarter) and 2006.  
 
They found that the average annual return of unlisted infrastructure funds of 14.1% was 
higher than the returns of bonds (7.2%), stocks (12.9%) and direct property (10.9%). 
Direct property had a significantly high Sharpe ratio of 3.67, while unlisted 
infrastructure came second (1.47), followed by stocks (0.67) and bonds (0.39) ranked 
at the bottom. Volatility of unlisted infrastructure (5.8%) is lower than that of the listed 
asset classes but higher than for bonds (4.3%) and direct property (1.5%). Listed 
infrastructure shows both higher returns and risk than unlisted infrastructure. 
 
According to Swiss Re (2014), infrastructure bonds and loans meet several needs of 
institutional investors, such as regular cash flows and attractive risk-adjusted yields. 
They offer a significant premium over Treasury rates and coupons have remained stable 
despite the decline in US Treasury yields in recent years. During the financial crisis in 
2008/2009, infrastructure debt remained resilient in terms of spreads, and did not suffer 
a jump in default rates. 
 
Wiesdorf (2007) found Australian infrastructure to be less correlated with traditional 
asset class returns offering attractive inflation protection characteristics. Its correlation 
with Australian equities was 0.32, bonds 0.04, listed property 0.16 and international 





equities 0.00. Other asset classes were found to be highly correlated such as Australian 
bonds and listed property who had a correlation coefficient of 0.52. 
 
Russ, Thambiah, and Foscar (2010) show that infrastructure correlations stayed 
relatively low against most analyzed asset classes in the period between July 2000 and 
March 2010, with the exception of non-US equities. They also find that adding 
infrastructure to an institutional portfolio improves return per unit of risk (Sharpe 
Ratio). When they compare a portfolio with no infrastructure to a portfolio with 5% 
infrastructure and 5% customized infrastructure, they find that the Sharpe ratio 
increases from 0.75 to 0.8 and the overall risk of the portfolio decreases. 
 
J.P. Morgan (2011) studied changes in the cash flows of unlisted American and 
European infrastructure assets between 1986 and 2010 and found the cash flows to 
demonstrate low volatility over time. Their study also found very low correlation 
between the cash flows of infrastructure assets and similar indicators for other asset 
classes (EBITDA for equity and net operating income for real estate). Their study 
further shows that increasing a portfolio’s allocation to infrastructure from 0% to 20% 
increases a portfolio’s Sharpe Ratio from 0.45% to 0.54%. 
 
Roberts, Patel and Minella (2015) argue that the quasi-monopolistic nature of 
infrastructure assets, high barriers to entry, as well regulation can protect returns from 
market risk and volatility, limiting exposure to the economic cycle. Their results show 
that unlisted infrastructure exhibits low, negative correlation with global bonds (-0.25); 
equity markets (-0.20) and listed infrastructure (-0.12). These results suggest that there 
are diversification benefits with unlisted infrastructure. Their study also shows that 





unlisted infrastructure exposes investors to lower volatility and hence produces more 
attractive risk-adjusted returns. Using quarterly data over a period of 5 years to 
December 2014, they find unlisted infrastructure to have a significantly high Sharpe 
ratio (3.6) compared to listed equities (0.9); global bonds (0.5) and listed infrastructure 
(1.3). 
 
Prudential Investments (2015) found that adding infrastructure to a diversified portfolio 
of traditional stocks and bonds has improved returns while reducing volatility. 
Analysing two portfolio returns between December 2001 and September 2015, their 
results show that the portfolio with 40% equities, 40% in bonds and 20% infrastructure 
had a Sharpe Ratio of 0.68 whilst the portfolio with 60% equities and 40% bonds has a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.53 
 
4.6.3.1 Analysis of infrastructure returns 
In this section of the paper we test whether infrastructure has higher returns than 
traditional asset classes that continue to dominate portfolios; we assess if it is indeed 
less correlated with the other asset classes using a correlation matrix; and finally we 
will test whether infrastructure offers superior risk-adjusted returns than other assets 
using the Sharpe Ratio. 
   
We will be using the Dow Jones Brookfield Global Infrastructure Broad Market 
Corporate Bond index as a proxy for infrastructure debt. For equities we will use the 
S&P Global Broad Market Index; the S&P Global Real Estate Investment Trust for 
global property; the S&P GSCI for commodities; the S&P International Corporate 
Bond Index for corporate bonds; and the Citigroup World Government Bond Index for 





government bonds. We used the United States 3-month Treasury-Bill rate as our risk-
free rate. We will use monthly Total Returns (TR) over a 10-year period, January 2005 
– December 2014. 
Table 1: Annualized Returns 
 
 
Our results show that in 2014, infrastructure had the second highest returns after Real 
Estate. We also see that Commodities had a dismal performance with -33.06% in 
annualized returns, which is consistent with trend of plummeting global commodity 
prices. Looking at the 3 and 5 year annualized returns, we see that Infrastructure 
provided the third highest returns after Real Estate and Equities. Infrastructure returns 










Asset Class 1 year ('14) 3 year ('12-'14) 5 year  ('10-'14) 10 year ('05-'14) 
Dow Jones 
Infrastructure Index 6,51% 6,25% 5,95% 5,61% 
S&P Global REIT 22,81% 16,03% 14,42% 6,97% 
S&P Global BMI 4,36% 14,91% 10,02% 6,97% 
S&P GSCI -33,06% -12,86% -6,54% -4,79% 
Citi World Gov Bond 
Index -0,48% -0,97% 1,67% 3,08% 
S&P Inter Corp 
Bond Index -0,71% 5,87% 4,93% 6,08% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Standard & Poor’s and Citigroup 
























Index 1      
S&P Global REIT -0,0005 1     
S&P Global BMI 0,0790 0,8362 1    
S&P GSCI 0,0277 0,3658 0,5811 1   
Citi WGBI 0,1411 0,3082 0,2604 0,2083 1  
S&P Int Corp 
Bond Index 0,1725 0,5521 0,6428 0,4719 0,7623 1 
 
 
The results from the correlation matrix are consistent with the findings of previous 
research. Compared to all the other asset classes, infrastructure investment returns have 
low a correlation with all the other asset classes. 
 
There are several reasons why infrastructure is less correlated with the other asset 
classes. Firstly, infrastructure is highly regulated, normally by the government or a 
government related entity allowing for prices to be set above inflation. Secondly, 
infrastructure is associated with high barriers to entry; therefore limiting competition 
and creating an asset that is effectively a monopoly with price setting powers. Lastly, 
infrastructure assets are usually necessities such as electricity, water, transport, and 
utilities that consumers (households, businesses and government) cannot function 
without. They are essentially defensive assets that provide stable cash flows even 
during challenging macroeconomic conditions. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Standard & Poor’s and Citigroup 





From an institutional investor’s perspective, infrastructure assets would be able to 
provide stable returns over the long-term while remaining less correlated with the other 
asset classes. 






5 year ('10 - 
'14) 
10 year ('05 - 
'14) 
Dow Jones Infrastructure 
Index 2,47 0,96 0,70 0,34 
S&P Global REIT 2,01 0,74 0,41 0,08 
S&P Global BMI 0,49 0,80 0,30 0,11 
S&P GSCI -1,78 -0,44 -0,16 -0,08 
Citi WGBI -0,11 -0,14 0,14 0,09 
S&P Int Corp Bond Index -0,13 0,45 0,22 0,16 
 
 
As we see from the table above, infrastructure had the highest risk-adjusted returns as 
compared to all the other asset classes across all the periods. This further illustrates that 
there are diversification benefits to including infrastructure in a portfolio. We also see 
that infrastructure risk adjusted returns appear to be less volatile than the other asset 
classes. We see negative risk-adjusted returns for global commodities, which is 
consistent with the commodities cycle since the early 2000s. 
 
To further test the attractiveness of infrastructure as an asset class, we conduct a mean-
variance spanning test developed by Huberman and Kendal (1987) to determine 
whether infrastructure provides diversification benefits when added to a portfolio of 
other assets. This is a multivariate test of the hypothesis that the minimum-variance 
frontier of a set of K benchmark assets is identical to the minimum-variance frontier of 
a set of K assets plus a set of N test assets. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Standard & Poor’s and Citigroup Data 





Applying the mean-variance test into our portfolio optimization problem gives us the 
following equation: 
𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇  +  𝛽3𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐶𝐼  +  𝛽4𝑅𝑊𝐺𝐵𝐼  
+  𝛽5𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝_𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
           (1) 
 
The test asset is infrastructure and our benchmark assets are equities, real estate, 
commodities, government bonds and corporate bonds. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the efficient frontier of our benchmark assets is the same as 
the efficient frontier of our benchmark assets plus infrastructure: 
 
𝐻0: 𝛼 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵1 +  𝐵2 +  𝐵3 +  𝐵4 +  𝐵5 = 1      (2) 
 
Once we have performed our multiple linear regression (Figure 11 in the Appendix), 
we then perform a Wald test, a test of joint significance, to determine whether 
infrastructure provides diversification benefits. Rejecting the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level will confirm that infrastructure improves the minimum-variance 
frontier and provides diversification benefits to investors. If we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis then the two efficient frontiers are the same and infrastructure provides no 
diversification benefits. Our Wald test (Figure 12 in the appendix) gives us F (2, 114) 
= 114.9938 and p-value = 0.0000. We therefore reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level and conclude that infrastructure does provide diversification benefits 
and leads to an improved efficient frontier. 
 





To verify the robustness of our results, we check the data for heteroskedasticity. One 
of the key assumptions in regression analysis is that the variance of the errors is constant 
across observations (Wooldridge, 2009). Using the Durbin-Watson test to check for 
heteroskedasticity, we get Durbin-Watson stat = 1.905484 which is close 2 (Figure 12 
in Appendix). If there is no heteroskedasticity, the Durbin-Watson statistic will be close 
to 2. Given a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.905, we can conclude that there is no 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
We therefore see that there are huge diversification benefits from including 
infrastructure in a portfolio. Firstly, it provides high and stable returns; it is less 
correlated with all the asset classes; and it delivers superior-risk adjusted returns 
compared to all the other asset classes. Our Wald test also shows that when added to a 
portfolio, infrastructure improves the efficient frontier, which means investors earn a 
higher return for the same level of risk. 
 
4.6.4 Low default rates 
Institutional Investors have a fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries or clients. A duty to 
act and make investment decisions that is in their best interests. Part of that duty 
includes investing in liquid, and high quality assets that provide stable returns over the 
long-term and have low probabilities of default. Although infrastructure is considered 
to be relatively illiquid compared to the other asset classes, we have shown it provides 
superior returns. In this section we will also show that historically it has had low default 
rates. 
  





Many countries enforce the fiduciary duty principle by regulating their institutional 
investors and by setting limits on the different types of asset classes institutional 
investors can invest in. High investment grade rated assets, which have low 
probabilities of default and are preferred to alternative investments that generally have 
low credit ratings and higher probabilities of default. 
 
Standard & Poor’s (2013) found that between 1992 and 2012, the annual default rate 
for all rated project finance debt averaged 1.5% which was slightly lower than the 
average corporate issuer default rate over the same period. On average projects are 
found to be no more risky than corporate entities at comparable rating levels. 
 




Their study also finds a clear correlation between ratings assigned and the observed 
frequency of default. In other words, the higher the initial rating, the lower the observed 
default frequency. Rated project finance issues generally had low default rates 
Source: Standard & Poor’s 2013 





equivalent to low investment-grade corporate entities, and higher prospects of recovery. 
The Gini coefficients for project finance were found to be lower than those for corporate 
defaults over the one-year, three-year, and five-year time horizons. This coefficient 
measures the correlation between ratings and default - a lower score indicates a higher 
percentage of defaults of higher rated entities  
  
Even though the average recovery rate for project finance is high at 75%, recovery rates 
form a barbell distribution, with some lenders receiving recoveries close to 100%, while 
others received minimal amounts, with few projects achieving recoveries close to the 
mean. It must be note that the sample of defaulted rated projects (19 projects from six 
countries.) is not large enough to be a statistically sufficient sample set, but it provides 
insight into recovery patterns of defaulted projects. 
 
Research by Moody’s (2015) found that the 10-year cumulative default rate for project 
finance bank loans is consistent with 10-year cumulative default rates for corporate 
issuers of low investment-grade credit quality. The results show continued 
improvement in default rates for project finance loans. Their results show that the 10-
year cumulative default rate (as per the Basel II definition) (BII) for the study data set 
is 6.4% and the 10-year cumulative default rate (as per Moody’s definition) (MDY) is 
5.5%. The simple average default rate (BII) stood was 7.0% in the power sector; 5.2% 
in the infrastructure industry sector and 6.1% in the oil & gas sectors.  
 
The cumulative default rates for corporate issuers with a Baa rating was 4.50% and 
20.10% for issuers with a Ba rating according to both the Basel II and Moody’s 
definitions. 





Figure 8: Cumulative Default Rates 1990 – 2013 
 
 
However, marginal default rates, which are the likelihood that a performing obligor at 
the start of a year will default in the same year, are initially consistent with marginal 
default rates shown by high speculative-grade credits, but trend towards marginal 
default rates consistent with single-A category ratings by year 10 from financial close. 
 





Source: Moody’s Investor Services 2015 
Moody’s Investor Services 2015 





The marginal annual default rates (BII) for project finance bank loans averaged 1.4% 
per annum during an initial three year period following financial close, but fall 
significantly thereafter trending towards marginal default rates consistent with single-
A category ratings by year 10 from financial close. Moody’s argues that the initial 
three-year period of higher marginal default rates is strongly associated with 
construction-phase risk and/or the commencement and ramp-up of operations, while 
the improvement in marginal default rates is associated with the maturity of project 
operations. 
 
It is interesting to note that Middle East had the lowest cumulative default rate at 1.05% 
followed by Africa at 2.18%. Using both the Basel II (BII) Moody’s (MDY) definitions, 
Africa has the lowest cumulative default rate at 0.79% followed by Middle East at 
1.05%. However, it can be argued that these two regions represent a small share of the 
study data set, accounting for 4.7% and 3.5% respectively. 
 
Looking at the recovery rates, we see that the average recovery rate for Ultimate 
Recoveries of 80.3% (BII) and 77.3% (MDY) exceeds the average recovery rate for 
Distressed Sales of 50.3% (BII) and 47.4% (MDY). The majority of Ultimate 
Recoveries, 65.1% (BII) and 62.3% (MDY), were fully restructured or repaid with no 
economic loss calculated on a Net Present Value basis. 
 









The Study Data Set also includes a substantial number of Ultimate Recoveries within 
the 0%-24% range which points to a bimodal distribution of recovery rates which has 
also been observed as a feature of corporate loan ultimate recoveries. 
  
One can draw three conclusions from the above. Firstly, project finance debt is just as 
risky as corporate debt. Secondly, although the cumulative default rates for project 
finance debt is higher than for investment grade rated corporate debt (Baa), the marginal 
annual default rates trend towards marginal default rates consistent with single-A 
category ratings in the long-term. Lastly, the ultimate recovery rates for project finance 
bank loans are similar to ultimate recovery rates for senior secured corporate bank 
loans. This is despite the distinct characteristics such as high leverage and long-tenor 
found in project finance loans, but generally associated with higher risk corporate loans. 
 
Source: Moody’s Investor Services 2015 





CHAPTER 5:  
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT  
IN SOUTH AFRICA REGARDING PROJECT BONDS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The protection of property rights is one of the most important factors that investors and 
lenders consider when investing and lending abroad. The risk of governments 
expropriating assets or choosing to default on loan obligations plays a crucial role in 
project finance and infrastructure finance. Unlike other investments, infrastructure 
assets are physical and immobile and because they are complicated assets, they are also 
illiquid. Because lenders have limited or no recourse to the project’s shareholders, they 
prefer to lend to projects located in countries where property rights are clearly defined, 
respected and well protected. Investors also consider a country’s legal institutions, law 
enforcement agencies, their government’s ability to pay and its credit rating (provided 
by the credit rating agencies) when making investment decisions. 
 
Infrastructure is highly regulated by the government which results in them interfering 
with its returns. In a survey conducted by Allen & Overy (2009) amongst different 
investors, 95% of the respondents believed that a robust rule of law was very important 
when deciding which country to invest in and 92% of the respondents believed that the 
attractiveness of the regulatory environment was very important. 
 
The findings by Allen & Overy (2009) are consistent with the findings of the MIGA-
EIU Political Risk Survey conducted amongst global investors. In the MIGA (2013) 
survey it was found that breach of contract and regulatory issues remain the most 
important for investors. 





The OECD (2014) argues that governments need to provide mechanisms to assist with 
more favourable regulatory conditions for investment in order to catalyse institutional 
investment in infrastructure. 
 
Mezui and Hundal (2013) found that many of the variables required for infrastructure 
project bond issuances are present in Sub-Saharan Africa, but more needs to be done to 
make it attractive for sponsors to tap into local markets. A crucial barrier in African 
markets is the enabling environment for infrastructure. The regulatory and tariff 
framework in many sectors is incomplete. Many countries have established PPP laws 
and institutions, but they lack the resources and capabilities to prepare bankable 
projects for the market. 
 
In this chapter we assess South Africa’s legal and regulatory environment to determine 
whether it provides enough protection to foreign investors who are needed to support 
the country’s infrastructure investment needs and project bond market. We will analyse 
the South African Constitution and the protection of property rights; we will look at 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) the country signed with major investment partners 
and the protection they provided to foreign investors; we will analyse the Promotion 
and Protection of Investment Bill, which looks to replace Bilateral Investment Treaties; 
and we will conclude the section by analysing the Infrastructure Development Act. 
 
5.2 Protection of Property Rights 
In South Africa, the protection of property rights is enshrined in the country’s 
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land and cannot be superseded by any 
other law of government. Section 25 of the Constitution states: “No one may be 





deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Property may be expropriated only in terms of 
law of general application – (a) for a public purpose of public interest; and subject to 
compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have 
either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court”. Section 25 
further states that “the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable” (The Constitution Of The Republic Of South Africa, 1996). 
 
The South African Constitution therefore makes it difficult for the state to expropriate 
any private property unless it is in the public’s interest and most importantly, the owners 
of the property must be justly compensated for their property. This is very important, 
as investment in infrastructure assets often reaches billions of dollars and investors and 
lenders look to the project to as the only source of cash flows used to service 
borrowings. If there is any risk that a government may expropriate assets, then countries 
will struggle to attract the required investment into their infrastructure projects. Under 
the South African constitution, property rights are well protected. 
 
South Africa has an independent judiciary whose primary objective is to protect the 
Constitution of the country. Section 165 (1) – (3), (5) of the South African Constitution 
states: “The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. The courts are 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. No person or organ of state may 
interfere with the functioning of the courts. An order or decision issued by a court binds 
all persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies” (The Constitution Of The 
Republic Of South Africa, 1996).  





South African common law, local legislation and the South African Constitution 
provide equal protection to local and foreign investors. They have access to the same 
law enforcement agencies and legal institutions. Most importantly, investors are able 
to take the South African government and government owned corporations to court and 
any decision of the court is binding on them as well. Government does not receive any 
special treatment and is bound by the decisions of the court. 
 
The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015 ranks 
South Africa 56th out of 144 countries in terms of competitiveness. Although the rating 
appears to be average, the country does well on measures of the quality of its institutions 
(36th), including intellectual property protection (22nd), property rights (20th), the 
efficiency of its legal framework in challenging and settling disputes (9th and 15th, 
respectively), and its top-notch accountability of private institutions (2nd). Furthermore, 
South Africa’s financial market development remains impressive in 7th place. The 
country remains very strong in the protection of property rights, ranking well above 
developed countries such as Australia (20th); France (21st); Belgium (24th); and the 
United States (25th). 
 
Investors are well protected under the South African Constitution and they enjoy the 
same rights and protection as local investors. To date South Africa has not been 
involved in any expropriation of assets and foreign investor confidence remains high 
as the country remains the largest beneficiary of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the 
African continent. As reported by UNCTAD (2015), between 2009 and 2014, South 
Africa continued to receive the largest share of FDI inflows into Africa. This evidences 





the strength of our institutions compared to rest of Africa and reinforces the confidence 
that investors have on the quality of our institutions and protection of their rights. 
 
5.3 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), as is common with other countries, 
seek to give foreign investors certain well-established protections and assurances in 
order to promote foreign investment in the economy including assurances as to 
expropriation (and compensation where it does occur), security, repatriation of capital 
and income from investments, equality of treatment with domestic investors and 
international arbitration of disputes. 
  
Immediately into the post-apartheid period (1994-1998), South Africa entered into 15 
BITs, mostly with European countries. In total South has entered into 47 BITs, although 
not all of them are in effect. In respect of the top 10 foreign investor countries in South 
Africa, seven BITs have been entered into. 
 
In 2010 the South African government conducted a review of its BIT obligations. 
According to Lang (2013) the review found that the BITs were allegedly skewed 
towards investors and that certain aspects of its BITs were incompatible with the 
Constitution and other South African laws. 
 
This led to a decision by the South African cabinet in July 2010 to develop a new 
investment act to codify typical BIT provisions into domestic law, and strengthen 
investor protection; terminate first-generation BITs and offer partners the possibility of 
renegotiating; and refrain from entering into BITs in the future, unless there are 





compelling economic and political reasons for doing so. At the beginning of October 
2012, South Africa cancelled its BITs with Belgium–Luxembourg, Spain, Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark. Kron and Clark (2015) state that South 
Africa will soon be cancelling its remaining European BITs. 
 
According to the Financial Times (2012), the BITs were signed in haste, as the country 
was trying to stimulate foreign investment post-apartheid and BITs were a quick way 
of doing this. However, when government implemented policies such as BEE, they 
were found to be in conflict with some conditions contained in the BITs. In 2007, Italian 
and Luxembourg investors filed a claim arguing that South Africa’s 2002 Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) contained provisions that amounted 
to expropriation of their mineral rights, violating the BITs South Africa had signed with 
both countries. 
 
South Africa is looking to replace the BITs with the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill which seeks to promote investments and clarify the level of protection 
that an investor may expect in South Africa and ensure that the country remains open 
to foreign investment. The intention is that foreign investments will in future be 
protected through domestic legislation. 
 
The obvious advantage with BITs is that they directly address investors’ concerns on 
risk and provide a binding agreement for South Africa to protect foreign investors. BITs 
are signed between two countries and they address key issues such taxes, expropriation, 
and settlement of disputes. The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill will not 
achieve the same objectives, as it will be a general legislation that protects foreign 





investors. It is likely to offer less protection than BITs, as it will not be “tailor” designed 
to the needs of the investor and investee country. Project bonds would have benefited 
from BITs as it would have eliminated the need to reassure investors that their 
investments are safe in South Africa and they would continue to receive preferential 
treatment. BITs were custom designed and addressed specific needs of both the parties. 
With the removal of BITs, extra work will now go into signaling to investors that 
foreign investment is safe in South Africa. 
 
According to Woolfrey (2012), a large body of literature has failed to demonstrate a 
consistent and positive relationship between BITs and inward FDI, with the results 
ambiguous at best. Brazil provides further evidence of this ambiguity, as it has become 
a major recipient of global FDI flows, while refraining from the use of BITs. 
 
While BITs are more preferred from an investor perspective, they need to be aligned to 
South Africa’s regulations(s) and developmental goals. It is also important that country 
urgently addresses any conflicts in their policies and regulations. This will aid in 
avoiding arbitrations such as those caused by the MRDA. It is important that the 
country has clear and coherent policies and legislation that are in line with global 
standards and ensure the protection of investors both local and foreign. 
 
5.4 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
The Bill is intended to replace Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) resulting in one 
domestic legislation that defines the protection that is offered to foreign investors in 
South Africa. Historically, South Africa has had BITs in place with an estimated 45 





countries, which served as an agreement between South Africa and investor countries 
on the protection and rights they would be afforded as foreign investors in South Africa. 
 
Among other things, the purpose of the Bill is to: “promote and protect investment in 
line with and subject to the Constitution, in a manner which balances the public interest 
and the rights and obligations of investors; confirm the protection of an investment in 
respect of national treatment and the security of an investment; and affirm the 
Republic’s sovereign right to regulate investments” (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2015). 
 
The Bill has received a lot of criticism from local and foreign market participants who 
believe that it does not provide sufficient protection to foreign investors, and foreign 
investors‚ by virtue of being non-citizens of South Africa‚ do not enjoy the same 
privileges as South African citizens. This is expected to have a negative effect on 
foreign investment in the country. 
 
Feris (2014) states that the major concerns that have been raised by the local and foreign 
business community include: the expropriation provisions in the Bill are not similar to 
traditional BITs; there is concern regarding whether the regulation of national treatment 
as an investment protection principle for foreign investors goes far enough in the 
revised Bill; and the dispute resolutions provisions determine that local remedies in 
local courts must first be exhausted before the government may consent to international 
arbitration, which was not a requirement in the BITs. 
 





There are several uncertainties that stand out when one analyses the Bill. Firstly, 
Section 6 states foreign investors will not be treated less favourably than local investors 
“in their business operations that are in like circumstances”. Essentially this means that 
foreign investors may be discriminated against if there are no “like circumstances”. 
Like circumstances have been vaguely defined as a “requirement for an overall 
examination on a case-by-case basis of all the terms of a foreign investment” - including 
the effect of the investment on South Africa, the sector and the “aim of any measure 
relating to foreign investments”. This is likely to cause a lot of uncertainty, as the case-
by-case basis will be subject a lot of interpretation and it is unlikely that there is 
precedent case law. 
 
Secondly, BITs allowed for foreign investors to refer an investment dispute with a 
government to international arbitration. However, as per Section 11 of the Bill, there is 
no provision allowing foreign (and local) investors to refer disputes to international 
arbitration. The Bill does not prohibit this but the government’s consent will now be 
required and we do not expect government to freely grant such permission as it may be 
viewed as undermining the sovereignty of South Africa and its legal system. The critical 
difference between the Bill and BITs means that disputes will now be determined under 
South African law, rather than international law. This may pose a major challenge for 
project and infrastructure finance as many legal agreements are typically signed under 
English and New York Law, due to the majority of the lenders and contractors being 
domiciled in those regions and having a strong preference for English and New York 
law. It may prove difficult to enforce English and New York Law in South African 
courts. 
 





While this may have serious implications for investment in South Africa, the country 
has competent law enforcement agencies, a strong and independent judiciary and courts 
are freely accessible, although it can be a very expensive process. Private participants 
are free to take the South African government and its institutions to court without any 
prejudice, and many of them have in the past. South Africa is also signatory to many 
international treaties and is a member of international bodies such as BRICS, G20, 
United Nations Security Council, World Trade Organization, World Bank Group and 
the International Monetary Fund. Therefore the country has an obligation to maintain 
world-class institutions (legal) and protect local and international economic participants 
given its role in the global community.  
 
Lastly, Section 8 of the Bill stipulates that an investment may be expropriated in 
accordance with the South African Constitution as described earlier. However the major 
change that comes with the Bill is that in the BITs and under international customary 
law, compensation is equal to the market value of the investment. The Bill states that 
the market value of the investment is just one factor to be taken into account; other 
factors include the current use of the investment, the history of its acquisition and the 
use and purpose of the expropriation. This definition of compensation is narrow and 
will cause further upset with investors, as they are no longer guaranteed the market 
value of their investments in the event of expropriation. The definition is not clear as to 
how investors will be compensated leaving it open to the courts to decide which 
compensation method is appropriate which will lead to many inconsistences, especially 
in the absence of precedent case law. 
 





Many argue that the Bill will scare away foreign investment in the country as it does 
not provide adequate protect to foreign investors. This could be a serious blow to 
attracting foreign investment in South Africa and launching project bonds to drive 
investment in South Africa’s infrastructure. 
 
The European Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2015) submitted several concerns 
to South Africa’s Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on the Bill. Firstly, the 
recent withdrawal of South Africa’s BITs has sent a negative message to the EU 
business community regarding the long-term standard of protection of investment in 
the country. As a result, this has increased the cost of doing business in South Africa 
where an increased (risk insurance) premium is associated with investing in countries 
where no BITs are in place. 
 
Secondly, they are concerned that security provided to investments is insufficient. They 
argue that the obligations of the government are vague and it is not clear what 
protections investors will be entitled to. Lastly, they remain very concerned about the 
exclusion of international investor-state dispute settlement as the bill favoured local 
remedies, and they argue that because the dispute will be with the state, the mediator 
should be an independent structure and/or independent and neutral individual. While 
independence is important in arbitration matters, there is clear evidence that the South 
Africa judiciary is independent and free from government influence. We have seen 
many cases involving the South African government and private enterprises where the 
government has lost and has had to obey the rulings of the court. 
 





The American Chamber of Commerce (2015) highlighted three concerns regarding the 
bill: firstly, under the Bill investors cannot expect compensation that is “fair”; secondly, 
fair and equitable treatment is not evident in the bill; and lastly, the promotion of 
investment is not evidenced anywhere in the bill. 
 
The concerns are valid; the Bill does not offer the same investor protection that BITs 
have historically offered to foreign investors. There are also uncertainties regarding the 
definition of compensation in the event of expropriation, making it unclear as to 
whether investors will receive the market value of their investment or an amount 
determined by the courts and exactly what mechanism they will use. 
 
South Africa is home to many multinational companies who employ many South 
Africans and have made significant investments in the country. The government has 
also entered into many Public-Private Partnerships including the Gautrain, N3 Toll 
Road, SANParks Concessions and the Chapman’s Peak Toll Road, with local and 
international investors. It is also seeking private investment for its power sector through 
its Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPP). The 
government is dedicated to attracting and retaining foreign investment in the country. 
With the introduction of the Bill, more work from government will be required to show 
that it does promote investment and investor protection. 
 
In order to continue attracting FDI, it is important that investors are certain that their 
assets are safe and that they will receive a return on their investment. In a time when 
the country is going through many challenges and requires external funding for its 
infrastructure projects, it is important that government sends a strong signal to show 





that foreign investments are safe in the country. There is a need for clear legislation that 
provides comfort to foreign investors. If project bonds are to be successful in South 
Africa, the assets they are used to finance must be secure as they are the only source of 
repayment. 
 
5.5 Infrastructure Development Act 
The Infrastructure Development Act introduced by the Ministry of Economic 
Development (2014) aims to ensure that infrastructure development in the South Africa 
is given priority in planning, approval and implementation and to improve the 
management of such infrastructure during all life-cycle phases. 
 
The act is intended to reduce bureaucracy associated with infrastructure development, 
so as to prioritise and speed up infrastructure rollout in South Africa. Eighteen Special 
Integrated Projects (SIPs) were identified in the country’s Infrastructure Development 
Plan. The SIPs include infrastructure projects aimed at fast tracking growth and 
development in South Africa. The identified projects will provide new infrastructure, 
assist in rehabilitating and upgrading existing infrastructure and will play a critical role 
in facilitating the regional integration for African co-operation and economic 
development on the African continent. 
 
The Act provides for the Presidential Infrastructure Coordination Committee to 
expropriate land, in terms of the Expropriation Act, for the purposes of implementing 
a SIP, and it provides compulsory timelines for the implementation of the SIPs 
according to the Ministry of Economic Development (2014). The Act will also set 
timeframes for the approval of regulatory decisions affecting the implementation of 





infrastructure projects. Instead of sequential approval processes, it provides for 
processes to run concurrently wherever possible.  
 
The Department of Environmental Affairs recently established a special unit to 
facilitate the speedy processing of environmental authorisation for the SIPs. 
Environmental Affairs, Water Affairs and the Department of Mineral Resources have 
developed an integrated licensing regime for mining, which will also affect all other 
development applications. 
  
Accountability is a prominent feature in the Act. The Act also establishes a Secretariat, 
which is primarily tasked with coordinating the implementation of any SIP by 
appointing members to a Steering Committee established for each SIP. The committee 
will report on a monthly basis to the Secretariat, providing progress on all phases of the 
planning, development and implementation of a strategic integrated project. The 
committees will also be responsible for identifying requirements for swift and effective 
implementation of their individual SIPs; identify challenges presented by the strategic 
integrated project that will impede or delay the implementation of the project, and 
identify associated remedial actions required. In addition, the committees must, without 
delay, report to the Secretariat the outcomes of all applications for approvals, 
authorisations, licences, permissions and exemptions. 
 
It is evident that the South African government is dedicated to the development of its 
infrastructure and much work has been done on the regulatory side to speed up the pace 
of infrastructure development. However, regulation alone will have little effect if the 





institutions and political will are not there to support the country’s infrastructure 
development. 
 
Although the South African legal system and its institutions are credible and highly 
regarded, it is evident that more work will be required to reassure foreign investors that 
they will be treated the same as local investors and that government is committed to 
protecting their investments. A lot of work has gone into developing this country, and 
it is important to recognise that if government began to expropriate assets, this would 
take the country many steps backwards. Foreign and local investors remain confident, 
hence their continued commitment to continue investing in South Africa. In February 
2015 BP announced a R4.7bn investment; in August 2015 VW announced a R4.5bn 
investment in a new plant (Allix, 20; and in September 2015 Sasol announced CAPEX 
of ZAR34bn between 2016 and 2017. 
 
 





CHAPTER 6:  
 
METHODOLOGY FOR THE REGRESSION ANAYLSIS OF THE  
DETERMINANTS OF AT-ISSUE SPREADS FOR PROJECT BONDS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we conduct an econometric analysis to determine the drivers of at-issue 
spreads for project bonds. The cost of international bond financing for infrastructure 
projects in developing countries is a key determinant of their tariff structure and, hence, 
economic viability according to Hauswald and Dailami (2003). While certain factors 
such as tenor, amount, credit rating, coupon and security would ordinarily determine 
the spread, there are other factors that are strongly considered by investors which 
include, the quality of the host country’s legal framework, the quality of a their 
institutions and the macroeconomic environment. 
 
Hauswald and Dailami (2003) find that for infrastructure projects located in developing 
countries looking to source financing from off-shore markets, the ability to design and 
enforce solid bond covenants to protect the interest of bondholders is a critical success 
factor. However, given the complexity of infrastructure project finance transactions, 
which involve multiple contracting stakeholders and complicated legal agreements, 
compounded by institutional voids and a weak rule of law, this is rendered a difficult 
task. 
 
The results of our econometric analysis show that there is a clear relationship between 
at-issue spreads and the legal and institutional environment; the perception of 
corruption in the country; and the protection of property rights in the host country. Our 
results also show that investors strongly consider the macroeconomic environment of 





the host country when pricing project bonds. When analysing our sample of project 
bonds, we find that developing country project bonds tend to have a lower credit rating, 
stricter covenants, and significantly higher at-issue spreads. 
 
Our results also show that the inflation rate, GDP rate and country risk measured using 
the sovereign 5-year credit default spread at the time of issuance (month when the bond 
is issued) are all significant factors in the pricing of project bonds. 
 
6.2 The model specification 
6.2.1 Variables 
To analyse at-issue spreads, we used project bonds issued between January 2009 and 
June 2015, which we obtained from Dealogic. There was missing data on certain 
variables due to the fact that some bonds are issued via private placements where 
disclosure is limited, unlike listed bonds where most information relating to the bond 
is public. Many of the bonds were also local currency bonds, which are rarely rated by 
the rating agencies. We then used Bloomberg and Thompson Reuters to obtain the 
missing data and to source additional information such as the structure of the bonds 
(secured or unsecured). We dropped all bonds where we could not find additional 
information. Furthermore, we only selected US dollar denominated bonds. 
 
For the Inflation and GDP rates, we used World Bank data. The World Bank provides 
annual data, which we assumed to be the prevailing average inflation and GDP rates 
when the bonds were issued.  





To measure country risk, we used the prevailing 5-year sovereign credit default spread 
(CDS) on the month of issuance, instead of the sovereign credit rating. Most researchers 
use the sovereign credit ratings (provided by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) 
when measuring sovereign risk. The challenge with credit ratings is that they do not 
reflect the most recent information regarding sovereign risk and they do not reflect the 
market’s perception on sovereign risk at a particular point in time. Sovereign credit 
default spreads, on the other hand, are traded instruments and they update immediately 
when new information regarding an economy becomes available. They reflect the 
changing market perception of sovereign risk as new information becomes available. 
The credit default spread information was obtained using the Bloomberg CDS Explorer 
available from the Bloomberg terminal. 
 
For project bond credit ratings we used Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit rating assigned 
to each individual project bond. This was obtained from Dealogic and Bloomberg. In 
cases where there was no S&P rating but a Moody’s rating, we converted the Moody’s 
rating to the S&P (see Table 6 in Appendix). Standard & Poor’s assigns a value 
corresponding to each credit rating. The highest credit rating, AAA, is assigned a value 
of 21 and the lowest credit rating, SD/D, is assigned the value 1. We then converted the 
credit ratings to their corresponding values. 
 
We used the International Country Risk Guide compiled by the Political Risk Services 
Group (PRS) to obtain country scores for legal and regulatory indicators. These include: 
Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Government 
Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. These 
scores range between 0-1, where 1 is the highest score a country can receive. 





6.2.2 The model 
To analyse the determinants of at-issue spreads for project bonds, we relate the spreads 
charged over the US Treasuries to the underlying bond information (amount, tenor, 
credit rating); host country economic indicators (inflation rate, GDP rate, exchange rate, 
sovereign risk); structure variable (secured or unsecured); and a set of variables 
measuring the quality of the host country’s legal, regulatory and political environment.  
  
We estimate the following linear cross-sectional model of project bond at-issue spreads 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression: 
 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  𝛽0 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑘𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑘𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑖   (3) 
+ ∑𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑘𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
 
Where 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the at-issue spread over US Treasuries, 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 captures the relevant 
bond issue information, 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 refers to whether the bond is secured or unsecured, 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 measures the host country’s key economic indicators and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 provides scores 
for several institutional and regulatory variables. 
 
Wooldridge (2009) provides five assumptions that are necessary to derive and use the 
OLS estimators from our regression. If these assumptions are satisfied, the alphas and 
betas of our OLS estimators are referred to as being BLUE – best linear unbiased 
estimators. Best linear unbiased estimators means: best – the variance of the OLS 
estimators is minimal, smaller than the variance of any other estimator; linear – if the 
relations is not linear – OLS is not applicable; and unbiased – the expected values of 





the estimated beta and alpha equals the true values describing the relationship between 
x and y. 
 
The five OLS assumptions can be described as follows:  
1. Linear in parameters – The dependent variable y is a linear function of a set of 
independent variables and a random error term. 
2. Random sample of 𝑛  Observations – The sample comprises of n-paired 
observations that have been randomly drawn from the population 
{𝑦𝑖: 𝑥2𝑖 , 𝑥3𝑖 , … 𝑥𝑘𝑖}; the number of observations is greater than the number of 
parameters to be, 𝑛 > 𝑘; the independent variables are non-stochastic, whose 
values are fixed. 
3. Zero conditional mean – the mean of the error terms has an expected value of 
zero, given values for the independent variables 𝐸(𝑈|𝑋) =  0 
4. No perfect collinearity – there exists no linear relationship between the 
independent variables. None of the independent variables, other than the 
variable associated with the intercept term, can be a constant. 
5. Homoskedasticity – The error terms all have the same variance and are not 
correlated with each other. In other words, the error terms are independent and 
identically distributed 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑖|𝑋) =  𝜎
2 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑗|𝑋) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
 
Combining the Gauss-Markov theorem with the unbiased property produces two 
desirable properties of the OLS estimator: unbiasedness and efficiency. The Gauss-
Markov theorem provides a very strong motivation to use OLS – it is unbiased and has 
a minimum variance within the class of unbiased and linear in Y estimators. OLS 





estimators have the minimum mean squared error among unbiased linear in Y 
estimators. 
 
With cross-sectional data we can use OLS to study the relationship between the at-issue 
spreads and our independent variables. Cross-sectional analysis is different to panel 
data analysis or time series data. According to Wooldridge (2009), a cross-sectional 
data set consists of a sample of individuals, households, firms, cities, states, countries, 
or a variety of other units taken at a given point. An important feature of cross-sectional 
data is that we can often assume that they have been obtained by random sampling from 
the underlying population. 
 
Time series data consists of observations on a variable or several variables over time, 
while panel data consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in the data 
set. With cross-sectional data, the same cross-sectional units are followed over a given 
time period. 
 
In our study, we are not observing our sample of project bonds over time, hence the 
reason we have used cross-sectional data. We are interested in the once-off at-issue 
price that is demanded by investors at the time the bonds are issued. The aim is to 
understand the factors that investors take into consideration when pricing the project 
bonds at the moment they are issued to the market. This will enable us to understand 
the critical factors that project sponsors need to consider before approaching the capital 
markets with project bonds so as to attract a good price for their bonds. 





6.3 A priori expectations 
Variable 
A priori 
expectation Justification Research Support 
  Economic Indicators  
GDP - (negative) We expect project bonds 
issued by countries with 
high GDP growth rates to 
have lower issuance 
spreads as the project is 
expected to generate high 
cash flows due to high 
economic activity 
Mayberger (2014); Tang and 
Yan(2006); Rowland and 
Torres (2004)   
Inflation + (positive) High inflation reduces the 
purchasing power of the 
bond's interest income and 
principal. Therefore higher 
inflation leads to a higher 
spread 
Kang and Pfluenger (2012); 
Deliandis and Geske (2001)  
Sovereign risk + (positive) High sovereign risk 
indicates increased 
probability of default which 
collapses a country's entire 
economy. Therefore higher 
sovereign risk commands a 
higher spread to 
compensate investors for 
taking additional risk 
Alonso, Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas (2015); Mayberger 
(2014); Nieto, Novales, and 




+ (positive) A rising exchange 
increases a country's 
exposure foreign debt debt. 
The country may not be 
able to service the foreign 
(dollar) debt in future which 
increases the risk for 
investors and leads to a 
higher spread. 
Alonso, Arghyrou, and 
Kontonikas (2015); Delikouras, 

















- (negative) Increased democracy and 
accountability will lead to 
lower spreads. It tells 
nvestors that leaders 
cannot do as they please 
and they can be held 
accountable for their 
actions 




- (negative) Political instability leads to 
economic instability and 
can collapse a countries 
political and economic 
systems. Therefore the 
more politically stable a 
country is, the lower the 
spread demanded by 
investors 




- (negative) The less bureaucracy a 
country has, the likelier that 
projects will be completed 
on time and will not 
experience any government 
approval delays. Therefore 
the lower the spread. 
Dailami and Hauswald (2003) 
Regulatory 
Quality 
- (negative) High regulatory quality 
means that investments are 
safe and investors are able 
to realise a return on the 
appropriate return on their 
investments. If a country's 
regulatory environment is 
sound, then investors will 
demand a lower spread 
Dailami and Hauswald (2003) 
Rule of Law - (negative) The protection of investor 
rights and well-functioning 
legal institutions are 
important for attracting 
investment. Projects 
situated in countries with 
well-defined property rights 
and functioning legal 
institutions will attract a 
lower spread. 
Dailami and Hauswald (2003) 







- (negative) Investors need to be certain 
that their investment will go 
towards specific projects 
and will not be misused by 
the borrowers. The tougher 
a host country is on 
corruption, the lower the 
spread demanded by 
lenders. 
Dailami and Hauswald (2003)  
  Bond Characteristics  
Amount - (negative) The higher the amount, the 
more liquid the issuance 
Fenn (2000); Helwege, Diaz 
and Navarro (2002); Huang 
and Wang (2013) 
Tenor + (positive) A longer tenor exposes 
investors to increased 
default and rate interest 
risk. They will demand a 
higher spread for taking on 
that risk 
Mayberger (2014); Dailami and 
Hauswald (2003); Eichengreen 
and Mody (1998); Amihud and 
Mendleson (1991) 
Coupon +(positive) The higher the coupon (the 
more interest bondholders 
have to pay on the coupon 
payments. Higher coupons 
are also associated with 
premium bonds, where 
coupon > yield and 
investors would demand a 
higher spread  
Wang, Wu and Zhang (2008); 
Edelberg (2014) 
Credit Rating - (negative) Investment grade rated 
bonds will have a lower 
spread than non-investment 
grade rated bonds. As the 
rating increases, the spread 
decreases because the 
(default) risk falls 
Dailami and Hauswald (2003); 
Gabbi and Sironi (2002); 
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) 
Security - (negative) Secured bonds should have 
a lower spread than 
unsecured bonds as the 
security gives investors a 
second way out. Unsecured 
bonds have a higher default 
rate than secured bonds 
Bonfim and Santos (2004); 
Gabbi and Sironi (2002) 
 





6.4 Variable definitions 
The table below provides definitions for the variables we used in our econometric 
analysis and data source for each of our variables. 
Table 4: Variable definitions and labels 
Label Variable Definitions Source 
  Economic Indicators  
GDP Rate gdp 
Annual % GDP, observed in a bond's year of 
issuance The World Bank 
Infation Rate inflation 
Annual % change in inflation observed in a 
bond's year of issuance The World Bank 
Sovereign risk cds_5year 
5-year Sovereign Credit Default Spread 
observed in a bond's month of issuance Bloomberg 
Exchange Rate exchange_rate 
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) observed in a bond's year of 
issuance The World Bank 
  Institutional Indicators  
Voice and 
Accountability accountability 
Military in politics; and Democratic 




Political Stability atability 
Government stability; Internal conflict; 
Internal conflict; Ethnic tensions observed in 





Bureaucratic quality observed in a bond's 
year of issuance 
Political Risk 
Services 
Regulatory Quality eegulation 




Rule of Law law 










  Bond Characteristics  
Amount amount 
Size of the bond, observed on each 
individual bond Dealogic/Bloomberg 
Tenor tenor 
Length of time until maturity which is the 
difference between issue date and maturity 
date, observed on each individual bond Dealogic/Bloomberg 
Coupon Coupon 
Interest payment that investors receive on 
the bond, observed on each individual bond Dealogic/Bloomberg 





Credit Rating sp_rating 
Standard & Poor's assigned rating, observed 
on each individual bond Dealogic/Bloomberg 
At-issue Spread Spread Issuance spread on each individual bond  Dealogic/Bloomberg 
Structure Secured 
Dummy variable differentiating between 
Secured and senior unsecured bonds Dealogic/Bloomberg 
 
6.5 Results 
The below table presents the results of our regression. The confidence interval has been 
excluded but is available in Figure 13 in the Appendix. We have used the 95% 
confidence level in our regression. Therefore, in interpreting our results, variables with 
p < 0.05 will be considered as significant and have an influence on at-issue spreads for 
project bonds. While some variables may not be significant from this regression, they 
can still be considered as important, based on previous empirical studies. 
Table 5: Regression results 
At-Issue Spread Coef. Std. Err t P>|t| 
Constant -7.696 4.345 0.49 0.093 
Amount 0.000 0.000 -2.37 0.633 
Tenor -0.080 0.033 -2.37 0.028 
Coupon 0.565 0.160 3.52 0.002 
S&P Rating -0.152 0.067 -2.27 0.035 
CDS_5year 2.079 0.578 3.60 0.002 
Exchange Rate 0.000 0.000 0.60 0.553 
Inflation Rate 0.233 0.186 1.25 0.226 
GDP Rate -0.122 0.072 -1.69 0.108 
Accountability 1.112 0.875 1.28 0.217 
Stability 0.784 3.807 0.21 0.839 
Effectiveness -1.479 4.236 -0.35 0.731 
Regulation 14.469 4.739 3.05 0.007 
Law -2.984 1.008 -2.96 0,008 
Corruption -3.380 1.528 -2.21 0,004 
Secured 1,442 4.345 2.29 0,033 
 





From the above we are able to draw several conclusions. Firstly, we see that the 
prevailing host country’s institutional environment is a very important consideration 
for investors when it comes to determining a project bond’s price. These variables have 
the largest and statistically most significant effect. An increase or improvement in 
Corruption Control and the Rule of Law has a significant decrease on at issue margins. 
An increase of 1 percent in Corruption Control and the Rule of Law decreases the bond 
margin by 3.38% and 2.98% respectively. These results reiterate the importance of the 
legal environment and institutions in order to access international financing, first 
pointed by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998). 
 
Using a country’s character of legal rules and quality of law enforcement, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found that countries with poorer investor 
protections also have smaller and narrower debt and equity capital markets. 
 
Modigliani and Perotti (1998) also find correlation between investor protection and the 
development of security markets. They argue that the legal environment will influence 
the firm’s choice between financing using debt capital markets or equity capital 
markets. 
 
Our results also show that the influence of the host country’s sovereign risk, as 
measured by the 5-year credit default spread (CDS) on the month of issuance of the 
bond, is large and statistically significant. A 1% increase in the CDS increases at-issue 
spreads by 2.07%. Credit default spreads are an indicator of the market’s current 
perception of sovereign risk, taking into consideration not only the sovereign credit 
rating but key economic indicators such as GDP growth, inflation, interest rates, fiscal 





and monetary policy. Unlike credit ratings, which can be considered as lagged 
variables, the CDS variable reflects the market’s current view on sovereign risk.  
 
In South Africa, sovereign risk appears to be the single most important determinant of 
corporate default premia according to research by Peter and Grandes (2005). Dailami 
(2010) found that sovereign risk measured using sovereign credit default spreads is 
positive and statistically significant in determining private corporate bond at-issue 
spreads in emerging market economies. Bocola (2014) found that an increase in the 
widening of credit default spreads (i.e. an increase) promotes the required premia 
demanded by banks for lending to the productive sector because this activity has 
become riskier. 
 
We also find the credit rating of the bond to be statistically significant where a point 
increase in the credit rating (as per the S&P rating scale in Table 7 in the Appendix) 
decreases the at-issue spread by 0.15%.  This implies that the higher the credit rating 
of the bond, the lower the at-issue spread demanded by investors. Higher rated bonds 
have a lower probability of default and are therefore less risky than bonds with a lower 
rating. Our results are similar to those of Sorge and Gadanecz (2004) who find that 
bond ratings corresponding to higher credit quality are significantly associated with 
lower spreads, with the magnitude of the discount diminishing as one goes down the 
rating scale. Bonds with below investment grade ratings, CCC and D, were found to be 
characterized by wider spreads. 
 
Our results also show that the coupon is a significant determinant of project bond at-
issue spreads, where a 1% increase in the coupon increases the spread by 0.533% (53.3 





basis points). While a higher coupon should be associated with a lower spread, it can 
be argued that since we have used only fixed-rate bonds, investors demand a higher 
margin since they will lose out in the event of high interest rates, where only floating-
rate bond investors benefit since the coupon rate adjusts with changes in the interest 
rate. 
 
We also find tenor to be statistically significant, but the relationship is negative, where 
an increase in the tenor of the bond by 1 year, decreases the spread by 0,088%. Our 
results differ from from Hauswald and Dailami (2003) who find a positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship (p = 0.0535). One possible reason for our results 
could be that our sample of bonds, the spreads on comparable US Treasuries were rising 
more than the spreads on project bonds resulting in narrower spreads. 
 
Lastly, we find that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
our dummy variable, Secured, which tests for the difference in effect between 
unsecured and secured bonds on the at-issue spread. Our results indicate that Secured 
bonds have at-issue spreads that are1.5% larger than at-issue spreads for unsecured 
bonds. This result differs with our apriori expecation, since unsecured lenders 
ultimately have no security should the project fail or be unable to repay bond investors. 
Secured investors have a second way out (the security) in the event of default and 
therefore should charge a lower spread. One reason for this result could be that secured 
bonds are a signal of the riskiness associated with a project and investors demand 
security as a second way out. If investors do not request security, it could mean they 
are comfortable with the project, which also feeds into the pricing of the bonds. 
 





Our results highlight two important implications for project bonds. Firstly, one cannot 
rely solely on the characteristics and structure of the bond to obtain attractive pricing 
from investors. As our results show, fixed income investors not only price in the 
characteristics of the bond, but also the economic and institutional environment of the 
host country. The economic and institutional environment are important for the success 
of the project and its ability to generate sufficient cash flows to repay bond investors. 
A deterioration in either of these environments affects the financing of future projects 
and the country’s ability to access capital markets funding in both the public and private 
sector. 
 
Secondly, if countries invest in creating sound and independent economic and 
regulatory economic, legal and regulatory institutions, they will be able to accelerate 
their infrastructure development through the capital markets and at reasonable cost. In 
our sample for example, we see emerging market borrowers issuing bonds for as much 
as $1.5bn at spreads of only 3.703% for non-investment grade projects. If we analyse 
the country’s economic and institutional environment for this particular issuer, we see 
a healthy economic (GDP growth rate is 7.57%, 5-year CDS is 110 basis points) and a 
strong institutional environment (Voice and Accountability is 0.75, Regulatory Quality 
is 0.64 and Government Effectiveness is 0.50). 
 
6.6. Regression Diagnostics 
We run several diagnostics to assess the validity of our model. If our model satisfies 
the assumptions, then we have OLS estimators that are BLUE - best linear unbiased 
estimators. 
 





6.6.1 R-squared (𝑹𝟐) and adjusted R-squared (?̅?𝟐) 
Firstly we look at the R2 of our model we see that R2 = 0.9231 (Figure 13 in Appendix). 
This tells us that 92.31% of the variation in our independent variable (at-issue spreads) 
can be explained by our independent variables. Wooldridge (2009) states that 𝑅2 is the 
proportion of the explained variation compared to the total variation; thus, it is 
interpreted as the fraction of the sample variation in y (dependent variable) that is 
explained x (independent variables). The 𝑅2 summarises how well the OLS regression 
line fits the data, where 𝑅2 = 1 means that OLS provides a perfect fit to the data. A 
value of 𝑅2 that is close to zero indicates a poor fit of the OLS line – very little of the 
variation in 𝑦𝑖 is captured by the variation in the 𝑦?̂? (Wooldridge, 2009). Our 𝑅
2 is close 
to one, which indicates that our independent variables do a good job in explaining the 
variation in our dependent variable. 
  
One can also look at the adjusted R-squared (?̅?2), known as the corrected R-squared. 
The primary attractiveness of ?̅?2  is that it imposes a penalty for adding additional 
independent variables to a model. As we are aware, 𝑅2 can never fall when a new 
independent variable is added to a regression equation because the Sum of Squared 
Residuals (SSR) never goes up as more independent variables are added. On the other 
hand, if we add a new independent variable to a regression equation, R-squared 
increases if, and only if, the 𝑡 statistic on the new variable is greater than one in absolute 
value (Wooldridge, 2009). Our regression produces a ?̅?2 = 0.8624, which is close to 1 
indicated that 86.24% of the variation in our independent variable is explained by our 
dependent variables. 
 






Wooldridge (2009) states that Heteroskedasticity violates the assumption that all the 
errors have the same variance. If it occurs this means that different observations’ errors 
have different variances. If we have hereroskedasticity, our OLS estimators are no 
longer BLUE. In other words, among all the unbiased estimators, OLS does not provide 
the estimate with the smallest variance. 
  
OLS is no longer optimal in the presence of Heteroskedasticity because it gives equal 
weight to all observations when, in fact, observations with larger disturbance variance 
contain less information than observations with smaller disturbance variance. 
Additionally, the standard errors are biased in the presence of Heteroskedasticity, which 
leads to bias in test statistics and confidence intervals according to Williams (2015). 
 
We use the Durbin-Watson test to test for the presence of Heteroskedasticity. The 
Durbin-Watson test assumes that all the error terms are stationary and normally 
distributed. It tests the null hypothesis 𝐻𝑜 , that the errors are uncorrelated against the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻1 , that the errors follow an AR1 process according to 
Wooldridge (2009). The null and alternate hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
𝐻0:  𝜌𝑠 = 0 
              𝐻1:  𝜌𝑠 > 0 
Running the Durbin-Watson test, we get d-statistic of 1.94 (Figure 14 in the Appendix). 
From our Durbin-Watson table, the critical values corresponding to 𝑛 = 35 and 𝑘  = 15 
are 𝑑𝐿 = 0.547 and 𝑑𝑢 = 2.716. Since 𝑑 = 1.94 > 𝑑𝐿 = 0.547, we fail to reject our 
null hypothesis and conclude there is no evidence of hereroskedasticity. We also know 
that if d statistic is close to 2 it indicates no correlation between the errors and, given a 





d statistic of 1.94, which is very close to 2, we can conclude that the error terms are 
uncorrelated 
 
6.6.3 Normality of error terms 
According to Wooldridge (2009), the normality assumption assumes that the 
unobserved error is normally distributed in the population. The normality assumption 
is very important for hypothesis testing as it assures us that the p-values for the t-tests 
and F-tests are valid.  
  
Osborne and Waters (2002) state that variables that are not normally distributed 
variables can distort relationships and significance tests. Outliers can influence both 
Type I and Type II errors and the overall accuracy of results. 
 
However, we should note that the normality assumption is of primary importance when 
we have small samples of data. According to Efron and Tibshirani (1986), non-
normality of the errors may be addressed by increasing the sample size . Given that our 
data set is small, it is important that we test for normality. Secondly, normality is not 
required in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients. OLS 
regression merely requires that the residuals (errors) be identically and independently 
distributed. 
 
To test for the normality of the error terms we will use the Shapiro-Wilk Normality test 
formulated by Shapiro and Wilk (1965). This tests the hypothesis that the data are 
independent and identically distributed and normal, i.e. N(μ, 𝜎2) for some unknown 
real μ and some 𝜎 > 0. 





The null hypothesis states that the data are normally distributed and the alternate 
hypothesis states that the data do not follow a normal distribution. A Shapiro-Wilk 
statistic (W) close to 1 indicates that the data are perfectly normal.  
 
The results from our Shapiro-Wilk test produce W = 0.96631 and p = 0.35009 (Figure 
15 in the Appendix). We there fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance 
level and conclude that there is insufficient evidence against the null hypothesis that 
the data are normally distributed. 
 
6.6.4 Multicollinearity 
Keith (2006) defines multicollinearity as the assumption that the independent variables 
are uncorrelated. Multicollinearity arises when several independent variables correlate 
at high levels with each other, or when one independent variable is a near linear 
combination of other independent variables. 
  
Wooldridge (2009) states that multicollinearity makes it impossible to separate the 
effects on different independent variables on the dependent variable. Correlation among 
regressors can lead to large standard errors for the OLS estimates. 
 
Having low collinearity is important because it allows the researcher to correctly 
interpret regression coefficients as the effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables. This means that we can make inferences about the causes and 
effects of variables reliably. 
 





We use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to test for Multicollinearity. As a rule 
of thumb, if a variable has a VIF greater than 10 and tolerance level less than 0.1, this 
indicates a high degree of correlation, which is of course problematic. 
 
From our results we see that six out of fifteen variables have a VIF greater than 10 and 
a tolerance level less than 0.1 (Figure 16 in the Appendix). From the six, three of the 
variables, namely: Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Political 
Stability are closely related and it could be argued that they measure the same thing 
which could be causing much of the multicollinearity. If we drop Government Effect 
from the regression equation, this improves the VIF of our other variables and improves 
the mean VIF from 22 to 7.65, which is reasonable (Figure 17 in the Appendix). We 
can therefore conclude that majority of the variables are collinear. 
 
6.6.5 Functional form misspecification 
In the case where the omitted variable is a function of an explanatory variable in the 
model, the model suffers from functional form misspecification according to 
Wooldridge (2009). A multiple regression model suffers from functional form 
misspecification when it does not correctly account for the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the observed independent variables. 
  
Wooldridge (2009) argues that, for example, if hourly wage is determined by 
log(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) =  𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 +  𝛽2𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟  + 𝛽3𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟
2 + 𝑢 , but we omit the squared 
experience term, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟2, then we are committing functional form misspecification. 
This leads to biased estimators of 𝛽0, 𝛽1, and 𝛽2. Therefore, misspecifying how 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟 





affects log (𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒) will generally result in a biased of the return to education, 𝛽1. The 
extent of this bias depends on the size of 𝛽3 and the correlation among 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐, 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟, 
and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟2. 
 
It is important to note that although misspecifying the functional form of a model can 
have serious consequences, in one important respect, the problem is minor. By 
definition, we have the data on all the important variables for obtaining a functional 
form relationship that fits the data well. This can be contrasted with the problem where 
a key variable is omitted, on which we cannot collect data. 
 
We use the linktest developed by Pregibon (1980) to test for model misspecification. 
The test performs a model specification link test for single-equation models. The 
linktest is based on the notion that if a regression is properly specified, we should not 
be able to find any additional independent variables that are significant, except by 
chance. The linktest creates two new variables, the variable of prediction, _hat, and the 
variable of squared prediction, _hatsq.  
 
The model is then refit, using these two variables as predictors; _hat should be 
significant since it is the predicted value. On the other hand, _hatsq shouldn't be 
significant because, if our model is specified correctly, the squared predictions should 
not have much explanatory power. That is, we wouldn't expect _hatsq to be a significant 
predictor if our model is specified correctly. So we will be paying attention to the p-
value for _hatsq. 
 





From the linktest we find _hat to be significant (p = 0.004 < p = 0.05) and more 
importantly, _hatsq is insignificant since p = 0.130 > p = 0.05 (Figure 18 in Appendix). 
In other words, using the linktest, we fail to reject the assumption that our model is 































CHAPTER 7:  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined whether South Africa should begin to use project bonds 
to fund its infrastructure development ambitions. We have shown that the project bond 
market is a growing market and will become increasingly important in the future as 
commercial bank lending dries up and becomes increasingly expensive for long-term 
infrastructure finance. 
  
The paper has also shown that the capital markets are by far the largest source of 
funding, with bonds dominating debt capital markets lending, accounting for 70% in 
2014. Capital markets are therefore able to provide the quantum of funding at the 
required tenors for infrastructure projects and project sponsors and lead advisors will 
need to structure projects that are attractive to capital market investors. We also see that 
on average institutional investors have allocated only 1% of their assets to infrastructure 
assets; however, there is evidence that indicates that there is much greater appetite for 
infrastructure assets. Institutional investors are willing to increase their investment in 
infrastructure but face a shortage of well structure projects. 
 
Project bonds are a viable alternative source of funding, as they are able to meet both 
the objectives of issuers and investors. They provide access to capital markets, which 
are deep and liquid; they contain flexible covenants allowing project sponsors more 
control in the running of the project company and they can be a cheaper source of 
funding compared to bank loans. We expect bank financing to be even more expensive 





in the future as banks implement Basel III with the 2019 deadline fast approaching. 
Institutional investors benefit from low correlation with other assets, stable and superior 
risk-adjusted returns, and low default rates. 
 
From a legal and regulatory perspective, more needs to be done by the South African 
government to reassure investors that their investments are safe. Although the South 
African Constitution offers equal protection to both local and foreign investors, there 
are concerns regarding the new Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, which 
replaces the Bilateral Investment Treaties, which are preferred by local and foreign 
investors and stakeholders. Nonetheless, as per the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015, South Africa still does well in the ranking of the 
quality of its institutions (36th), legal framework (9th) and protection of property rights 
(20th). 
 
When looking at the determinants of at-issue spreads for project bonds, we see that the 
host country’s institutional, regulatory, and economic environment variables are 
statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, institutional investors take into consideration 
those variables when pricing project bonds. Although the project’s characteristics 
(tenor, amount, credit rating etc.) are important determinants of pricing, the 
performance of a country is equally important to ensure the success of a project. 
 
From a regulatory, institutional, economic and market perspective, South Africa should 
start using project bonds to fund its infrastructure development. Emerging markets such 
as Brazil, Peru, Malaysia and Mexico have been successful in using project bonds, even 
though they face similar challenges as South Africa. The country has the right 









The study provides an opportunity to conduct future in-depth research on how project 
bonds can be used to fund infrastructure locally and globally. Future studies should 
consider the following: 
 
1. Little empirical work has been done in analysing infrastructure as an asset class 
and its returns compared to the traditional asset classes. Infrastructure could be 
very attractive to institutional investors if found to provide stable risk-adjusted 
returns. 
2. More work should be done in analysing the role that could be played by both 
banks and institutional investors in infrastructure financing. Banks have the 
experience and expertise; institutional investors have the capital required. More 
cooperation between these institutions could create a large and coordinated 
project bond market. 
3. The determinants of project bond (at issue) spreads remain under analysed. This 
is an opportunity for future studies to focus solely in studying the determinants 
of project bond spreads. 
4. Future studies could also look at risks associated with project bonds and how 
these can be mitigated contractually and through financial instruments. 
5. It would also be important to look at whether projects bonds are cheaper than 
bank loans. Ultimately, pricing will be a major factor in driving the growth of 
the project bond market. 
















































Table 7: Scale of Standard and Poor’s foreign currency debt rating 
      
Interpretations Rating Assigned Value 
Investment-grade ratings   
Highest quality AAA 21 
High quality AA+ 20 
 AA 19 
 AA- 18 
Strong payment capacity A+ 17 
 A 16 
 A- 15 
Adequate Capacity BBB+ 14 
 BBB 13 
 BBB- 12 
   
Noninvestment-grade ratings   
Likely to fulfill obligations, ongoing uncertainty BB+ 11 
 BB 10 
 BB- 9 
High-risk obligation B+ 8 
 B 7 
 B- 6 
Currently vulnerable nonpayment obligation CCC+ 5 
 CCC 4 
 CCC- 3 
Highly vulnerable to nonpayment CC/C 2 
















Figure 11: Multiple regression results 
 
Dependent Variable: INFRASTRUCTURE  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/20/15   Time: 15:10   
Sample: 2005M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 120   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.004093 0.001097 3.731290 0.0003 
BMI 0.060474 0.054215 1.115447 0.2670 
CORP_BOND 0.082335 0.088787 0.927337 0.3557 
GSCI -0.018944 0.020024 -0.946032 0.3461 
REIT -0.053886 0.033197 -1.623208 0.1073 
WGBI 0.026387 0.100501 0.262557 0.7934 
     
     R-squared 0.055719    Mean dependent var 0.004630 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014304    S.D. dependent var 0.011734 
S.E. of regression 0.011649    Akaike info criterion -6.018433 
Sum squared resid 0.015471    Schwarz criterion -5.879058 
Log likelihood 367.1060    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.961832 
F-statistic 1.345367    Durbin-Watson stat 1.905484 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.250387    
     
      
Figure 12: Wald Test 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  114.9938 (2, 114)  0.0000 
Chi-square  229.9876  2  0.0000 
    
        
Null Hypothesis: C(1)=0, C(2)+C(3)+C(4)+C(5)+C(6)=1 
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(1)  0.004093  0.001097 
-1 + C(2) + C(3) + C(4) + C(5) + C(6) -0.903633  0.060039 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 




























Figure 17: Variance Inflation Test (after removing government effectiveness as 











































African Development Bank Group. (2012). Accessing Local Markets for 
Infrastructure : Lessons for Africa. 
Allen & Overy. (2009). Global infrastructure development and delivery. London. 
Bassanini, F., Del Bufalo, G., & Reviglio, E. (2011). Financing Infrastructure in 
Europe Project Bonds , Solvency II and the “ Connecting Europe ” Facility, 1–
22. 
BCBS. (2006). International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards. Bank for International Settlements. Basel. Retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf 
Bocola, L. (2013). The Pass-Through of Sovereign Risk. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Boudrias, J.-P., & Kotkin, R. (2012). Project Bonds in Project Finance. In R. 
Morrison (Ed.), The Principles of Project Finance (1st ed., Vol. 53, p. 11). 
Surrey: Gower Publishing Limited. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E. (2007). Planning a research project and formulating research 
questions. In: Business Research Methods. New York, NY. Oxford University Press. 
Calderón, C. (2009). Infrastructure and Growth in Africa. Infrastructure and growth 
in Africa. Washington. doi:10.1787/225682848268 
Çelik, S., & Isaksson, M. (2014). Institutional investors. OECD Journal: Financial 
Market Trends, 2013/2, 93–114. 
Chan, E., & Worth, M. (2011). Basel III and project finance. Project Finance 
International, (460), 1–8. 
Chan-fishel, M. (2003). Project Finance Trends: Key players, regions, and sectors. 
Conduit, T., & Lee, D. (2013). Innovation in Project Bonds. Allen & Overy LLP. 
Contessi, S., Li, L., & Russ, K. (2013). Bank vs. bond financing over the business 
cycle. Economic Synopses. St. Louis. 
Creswell, John.W. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. Los Angeles, LA: Sage Publication. 
Croce, R. Della. (2014). Are institutional investors the answer for long-term 
development financing ? 
Croce, R. Della, & Gatti, S. (2014). Financing infrastructure – International trends. 
OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2014/1(1), 123–138. 





Croce, R. Della, & Yermo, J. (2013). Institutional Investors and Infrastructure 
Financing. 
Dailami, M., & Hauswald, R. (2003). The Emerging Project Bond Market : Covenant 
Provisions and Credit Spreads, 0–35. 
Davison, A. (2015). Announcement : Moody ’ s : Default rates for project finance 
bank loans improve. London. 
Dhondt, T., Krawchenko, A., & Traxler, F. (2014). Ad-hoc audit of the pilot phase of 
the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative. London. 
Dornel, A. (2014). Project Finance for Infrastructure in Africa. The World Bank. 
Doyle, C., & Murphy, T. (2012). second coming : the re-emergence of the Canadian 
bond market for P3 projects. Toronto. 
Efron, B., & Tibshirani, R. (1986). Bootstrap Methods for Standard Errors, 
Confidence Intervals, and Other Measures of Statistical Accuracy. Statistical 
Science, 1(1), 54–77. 
Ehlers, T. (2014). Understanding the challenges for infrastructure finance. 
Ehlers, T., Packer, F., & Remolona, E. (2014). Infrastructure and Corporate Bond 
Markets in Asia, 67–91. 
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., Agrawal, D., & Mann, C. (2001). Explaining the Rate 
Spread on Corporate Bonds. The Journal of Finance, 56(1), 32. 
doi:10.2307/222468 
Engles, M. (2004). Portfolio Optimization: Beyond Markowitz. Master’s Thesis. 
Universiteit Leiden. Retrieved from 
http://eom.pp.ua/books/??????/?????????????? ?????? ??????????? ???????/[Enge
ls] Portfolio Optimization MSc Thesis [04].MsuCity.pdf 
Erol, T., & Ozuturk, D. (2014). An Alternative Model of Infrastructure Financing 
Based on Capital Markets: Infrastructure REITS (InfraREITs) in Turkey. 
Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 32(3), 65–88. 
doi:10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2 
Estache, A., Speciale, B., & Veredas, D. (2005). How much does infrastructure matter 
to growth in Sub-Saharan Africa ?*, (June), 1–21. 
Esty, B. C. (2002). When Do Foreign Banks Finance Domestic Projects ? New 
Evidence on the Importance of Legal and Financial Systems by, (617), 42. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.594526 
Esty, B. C. (2004). Why Study Large Projects? An Introduction to Research on 





Project Finance. European Financial Management, 10(2), 213–224. 
doi:10.1111/j.1354-7798.2004.00247.x 
Esty, B. C., Chavich, C., & Sesia, A. (2014). An Overview of Project Finance and 
Infrastructure Finance — 2014 Update. Hardvard Business School, 9-214-
083(July). 
Esty, B. C., & Christov, I. L. (2002). An Overview of Project Finance - 2001 Update. 
Boston. 
European PPP Expertise Centre. (2012). Financing PPPs with project bonds Issues 
for public procuring authorities. 
Feris, J. (2015). Does the Investment Bill provide any real guarantees for foreign 
investors. Johannesburg. 
Foster, V., & Briceño-Garmendia, C. (2010). Africa’s Infrastructure A Time for 
Transformation. 
Fourie, M. (2014). Sustainability, not a new bill, will fix SA’s infrastructure. 
Retrieved September 3, 2015, from 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/01/23/sustainability-not-a-new-bill-will-
fix-sas-infrastructure 
Gardner, D., & Wright, J. (2011). Project Finance. 
Gill, J., & Johnson, P. (2002). Research Methods for Management. (3rd ed.) 
London, UK: Sage Publication. 
Groobey, C., Pierce, J., Faber, M., & Broome, G. (2010). Project Finance Primer for 
Renewable Energy and Clean Tech Projects. Austin. 
Grosskopf, J., & Beyers, S. (2015). Major banks analysis – South Africa. 
Johannesburg. 
Hale, G. (2001). Bonds or Loans? On the Choice of International Debt Instrument by 
Emerging Market Borrowers. Journal of Economic Literature, 1–49. 
Hale, G., & Santos, J. a C. (2008). Do banks price their informational monopoly? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 185–206. 
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.003 
Hauswald, R., & Dailami, M. (2003). The Emerging Project Bond Market, (July), 44. 
Infrastructure Australia. (2014). Review of Infrastructure Debt Capital Market 
Financing. Sydney. 
Johnson, S., McMillan, J., & Woodruff, C. (2002). No Title (No. 8852). 
Kron, J., & Clark, M. (2015). South Africa’s changing approach to investment 





protection. Johannesburg. Retrieved from 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/127737/south-
africas-changing-approach-to-investment-protection 
Kumo, W. L., Omilola, B., & Minsat, A. (2015). South Africa 2015. African 
Economic Outlook. Abidjan. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Legal 
Determinants Of External Finance (No. 5879). Massachusetts. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and 
Finance. The Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113–1155. 




Maboja, W. (2015). BP expands investment in Africa’s oil and gas space. 
Mantshantsha, S. (2014). Sasol goes ahead with R135bn expansion. Retrieved 
October 20, 2015, from 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2015/09/08/sasol-goes-ahead-with-
r135bn-expansion 
Masetti, O. (2013). Capital markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Maxwell, W., & Shenkman, M. (2010). Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics. 
(W. Maxwell & M. Shenkman, Eds.) (1st ed.). Dall: McGraw Hill. 
McKinsey Global Institute. (2013). Infrastructure productivity: how to save $1 
trillion a year. McKinsey Global Institute. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Infrastructure
+productivity:+How+to+save+$1+trillion+a+year#0 
McLaughlin, C., & Yessios, D. (2011). Why Project Bonds? Why Now? 
Mclean, G. (2015). Project Bonds and their role in transport infrastructure finance. 
London. 
Mezui, C. A. M., & Hundal, B. (2013). Conditions for Infrastructure Project Bonds in 
African markets. 
MIGA. (2013). World Investment and Political Risk. Washington. doi:10.1596/978-1-
4648-0039-9 
Ministry of Economic Development. Act No. 23 of 2014: Infrastructure Development 
Act, 2014, 588 Government Gazette 4–6 (2014). South Africa: The Presidency, 





Government of South Africa. doi:102GOU/B 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, Access 
12 (2015). South Africa. 
Modigliani, F., & Perotti, E. (1998). Security versus Bank Finance: the Importance of 
a Proper Enforcement of Legal Rules. Massachusetts: MIT Sloan School of 
Management. doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Murinde, V. (2006). Capital markets: Roles and challenges. In “Accelerating Africa’s 




Mussa, M., & Goldstein, M. (1993). The Integration of World Capital Markets (No. 
93/95). Washington. Retrieved from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=883835 
National Treasury. (2015). Budget Review 2015. Pretoria. Retrieved from 
www.treasury.gov.za 
Neuman, L. W. (1997). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. 
Newman, I., & Benz, C. R. (1998). Qualitative-quantitative research methodology: 
Exploring the interactive continuum. Carbondale, IL: University of Illinois Press 
O’Sullivan, M., & White, J. (2015). Structuring Covenants in Leveraged Loans and 
High Yield Bonds for Borrowers and Lenders. In Sherman & Sterling LLP (Ed.), 
Sherman & Sterling LLP (pp. 1–24). New York: Sherman & Sterling LLP. 
OECD. (2015). Infrastructure Financing Instruments and Incentives. Paris. 
OECD, & Oliver Wyman. (2011). PROJECT ON STRATEGIC TRANSPORT 
INFRASTRUCTURE TO 2030 PENSION FUNDS INVESTMENT IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE: A SURVEY. Paris. 
Oji, C. K. (2015). Bonds: A Viable Alternative for Financing Africa ’ s Development. 
Johannesburg. 
Oliver Wyman. (2011). Pension Funds Investment in Infrastructure: A Survey. Paris. 
Osborne, J., & Waters, E. (2002). Four assumptions of multiple regression that 
researchers should always test. doi:http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=8&n=2 
Oxford Economics, & PWC. (2014). Outlook to 2025. New York. 





Payden & Rygel Research. (2013). A Primer on Syndicated Term Loans. Los 
Angeles. 
Peter, M., & Grandes, M. (2005). How Important Is Sovereign Risk in Determining 
Corporate Default Premia? The Case of South Africa (No. 05). IMF Working 
Papers (Vol. 05). Washington. doi:10.5089/9781451862362.001 
PFI. (2003). League Tables: Results 2002. New York. 
Preqin. (2015a). 2015 Preqin Global Infrastructure Report. New York. 
Preqin. (2015b). Preqin Investor Outlook: Infrastructure H2 2015. Ney York. 




Rowland, P., & Torres, J. L. (2004). Determinants of Spread and Creditworthiness for 
Emerging Market Sovereign Debt : A Panel Data Study. Colombia. 
Sawant, R. J. (2010). Emerging market Infrastructure Project Bonds: Their Risks and 
Returns, 75–83. 
Schmukler, S. (2015). Institutional Investors: From Myth to Reality. Washington. 
Schoenberg, M. (2015). Achieving the Investment Plan for Europe’s € 315 billion 
ambition: 12 fixes. London. 




Shapiro, S. S., & Wilk, M. B. (1965). An Analysis of Variance Test for Normality 
(Complete Samples). Biometrika, 52(3/4), 591–611. doi:10.1093/biomet/52.3-
4.591 
Sheppard, R. (2003). Capital Markets Financing for Developing-Country 
Infrastructure Projects, (28). 
Simons, K. (1998). Risk-Adjusted Performance of Mutual Funds. New England 
Economic Review, 33–48. 
Sorge, M., & Gadanecz, B. (2004). The term structure of credit spreads in project 
finance (No. 159). Retrieved from 
http://wolpertinger.bangor.ac.uk/papers/F4_Paper_Sorge_Gadanecz_22Aug.pdf 
Standard Bank Group. (2013). Standard Bank Group arranges first renewable energy 





bond in South Africa. Retrieved September 15, 2015, from 
http://www.standardbank.com/pages/StandardBankGroup/web/newsArticle/2013
/NewsArticle-6May2013.html 
Standard & Poor’s. (2014). Global Infrastructure: How To Fill A $500 Billion Hole. 
McGraw Hill Financial. 
Swiss Re. (2014). Infrastructure Investing. It Matters. Zurich. 
Switala, H. (2009). Project finance and obtaining sufficient funding for the successful 
completion of your project. 
Teravaninthorn, S., & Raballand, G. (2009). Transport Prices and Costs in Africa. 
Washington. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-7650-8 
The Constitution Of The Republic Of South Africa. The Constitution Of The 
Republic Of South Africa (1996). South Africa. 
Thomas, D. R. (2003). A general inductive approach for qualitative data analysis. 
Auckland. doi:10.1177/1098214005283748 
Thomas, R. M. (2003). Blending qualitative and quantitative research methods in 
theses and dissertations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin. 
Thompson Reuters. (2015). Debt Capital Markets Review: Managing Underwriters. 
New York. 
Tralac. (2004). Investment Project: South African Case Study. 
UNCTAD. (2015). World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International 
Investment Governance. United Nations Publications. New York. 
doi:10.1007/s13398-014-0173-7.2 
Valahu, P. (2006). The wave of the future : Capital markets financing for 
infrastructure projects. Washington. 
Van Nieuwerburgh, S., Stanton, R., & de Bever, L. (2015). A review of real estate 
and infrastructure investments by the Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
Global ( GPFG ). Oslow. 
Verde, M. (1999). Loan Preserver: The Value of Covenants. New York. 
Vita, T. (2011). Accessing the debt capital markets - High-yield bonds | Norton Rose 
Fulbright. Retrieved December 13, 2015, from 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/51946/accessing-
the-debt-capital-markets-high-yield-bonds 
Wee, D. (2014). CGIF aims to boost Asia’s project bond market - Debt - Deals - 
News -. Retrieved October 7, 2015, from 







Weisdorf, M. A. (2007). Infrastructure: A Growing Real Return Asset Class. CFA 
Institute Conference Proceedings Quarterly (Vol. 24). New York. 
doi:10.2469/cp.v24.n3.4849 
Williams, R. (2015a). Heteroskedasticity. Linear regression models. Indiana. 
Retrieved from https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l25.pdf 
Williams, R. (2015b). Multicollinearity. Indiana. 
Retrieved from https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). Introductory Econometrics. (M. Worls & L. Bofinger, 
Eds.) (4th ed.). Mason: Cengage Learning. doi:10.1016/j.jconhyd.2010.08.009 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2013). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. (J. 
Sabatino & M. Worls, Eds.) (5th ed.). Mason: Cengage Learning. 
Woolfrey, S. (2012). South Africa’s stance on bilateral investment treaties. Retrieved 
August 17, 2015, from http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5287-south-
africa-s-stance-on-bilateral-investment-treaties.html 
 
